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I. Introduction
In the wake of an unprecedented period of economic malaise and
political cynicism in the "Golden State," California politicians have
come upon one issue that is uniting people from diverse social, eco-
nomic, and political backgrounds. From all indications, the snake oil
of the 1994 elections will be immigration reform. Pete Wilson, the
Governor of California, has written a number of opinion essays calling
for, inter alia, a constitutional amendment denying citizenship to chil-
dren born in the United States whose parents are illegal residents.1
An examination of the protection vel non of the constitutional rights
afforded to these children reveals that the rights of citizen children
born to illegal aliens are, at best, illusory. Whether or not citizenship
status will eventually be denied to children of illegal aliens born within
United States borders, children who are currently born in the United
States to illegal aliens are citizens, entitled to constitutional
protection.2
This Article will examine the denial of constitutional rights to citi-
zen children born to illegal aliens. Although the United States Consti-
tution does not specify which branch of government has the power to
regulate immigration, the Supreme Court held that Congress is vested
with a plenary and unqualified power to determine which classes of
1. Pete Wilson, About Tme We Stopped Rewarding Illegals, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 29,
1993, (Outlook), at 1.
2. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. See also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
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aliens may enter and remain in the country.' Thus, the Court ruled
that an alien has no right to enter or remain in the United States 4
A different question, however, may be presented when the exclu-
sion or deportation of an alien affects the rights of a United States
citizen. In such situations, the United States citizen, not the alien,
would assert that the deportation or exclusion is unconstitutional.
One situation which frequently triggers the implication of consti-
tutional issues occurs when an alien requests relief from deportation
under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA").5
3. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). The Supreme Court stated,
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging
to the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers dele-
gated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judg-
ment of the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted
away or restrained on behalf of any one.
Id at 609. In the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court held
That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative
department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not
think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an
incident of every independent nation. It is part of its independence. If it could
not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of another
power.
Id at 603. The Court reaffirmed this principle in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698 (1983), when it stated: "The right to exclude or to expel all aliens, or any class of aliens,
absolutely or upon certain condition, in war or in peace, being an inherent and inalienable
right of every sovereign and independent nation.... ." Id. at 711. The Court has consist-
ently reaffirmed this principle by "sustain[ing] Congress' 'plenary power to make rules for
the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Con-
gress has forbidden."' Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (quoting Boutilier
v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967)). Additionally, the Court stated that "'over no conceiva-
ble subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over' the admis-
sion of aliens." Id at 766 (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339
(1909)).
The Supreme Court also stated in Fiallo v. Bell that
[a]t the outset, it is important to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry
into immigration legislation. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that "over no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is
over" the admission of aliens.... Our cases "have long recognized the power to
expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the
Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control."...
Our recent decisions have not departed from this long-established rule.
430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (citations omitted).
4. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1983); The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581, 599 (1889).
5. The relevant suspension of deportation provision states in part:
As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his discre-
tion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully admit-
ted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien (other than an alien described
in section 1251(a)(4)(D) of this title) who applies to the Attorney General for
suspension of deportation and -
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In order to be eligible for such relief, the alien must prove that his or
her deportation will cause extreme hardship to his or her United States
citizen child or lawful permanent resident spouse. A review of the
case law reveals that it is practically impossible for aliens to demon-
strate extreme hardship.6
Part I of this Article examines the constitutionality of deporting
an alien who is a parent of a United States citizen child. It is often
contended that the deportation of a citizen child's alien parents results
in an unconstitutional de facto deportation of the child because a citi-
zen may not constitutionally be deported. While the Supreme Court
has never considered the issue, many courts of appeal and several dis-
trict courts have reviewed such claims.7 These courts have unani-
mously held that the government may deport alien parents without
violating the constitutional rights of their citizen children.8
Part II of this Article analyzes whether the deportation of alien
parents violates the substantive due process rights of citizen children.
The courts' protection of fundamental family rights in other contexts
(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the provisions speci-
fied in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically present in the United
States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding
the date of such application, and proves that during all of such period he was and
is a person of good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in
the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to
his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien law-
fully admitted for permanent residence.
8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1988 & Supp. II 1993).
6. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (per curiam); Hernandez-Patino v. INS,
831 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1987); Hernandez-Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1987);
Sanchez v. INS, 755 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1985); Le Blanc v. INS, 715 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1983);
Bueno Carrillo v. Landon, 682 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1982).
7. The de facto deportation of citizen children occurs in other contexts outside the
suspension of deportation litigation. Nayak v. Vance, 463 F. Supp. 244 (D.S.C. 1978), for
example, involved alien parents as exchange visitors who had to return to their country
because of the two-year foreign residency requirement of INA § 212(e) codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e). Gallanosa v. United States, 785 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1986)
also involved an exchange visitor situation who fied a motion to reopen deportation to
apply for suspension. Other cases such as Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1977),
and Martinez de Mendoza v. INS, 567 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1977) (per curiam), are more
accurately described as dealing with a "stay of deportation." Acosta, 558 F.2d at 1155; see
also infra notes 114-124 and accompanying text. The question of de facto deportation of
citizen children in suspension cases is exacerbated because aliens often cannot afford to
retain counsel. In many cases in which aliens are fortunate enough to have counsel, coun-
sel either does not raise the constitutional issues or money runs out before the case gets
into federal court.
8. While one district court opinion held that the constitutional rights of citizen chil-
dren were violated by deportation of the non-citizen parents, Acosta v. Gaffney, 413 F.
Supp. 827 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1977), this decision was subsequently
reversed by the appellate court.
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will be contrasted with their complete denial of these same rights in
suspension of deportation proceedings. Part II concludes that citizen
children have substantive due process rights to remain with their par-
ents and to have their rights addressed in their parents' deportation
proceedings.
Part m11 will examine whether these citizen children have been
afforded their procedural due process rights. The role of the executive
branch and the courts in immigration matters is evaluated in this sec-
tion. Emphasis is placed on the extreme deference accorded by the
judiciary to agency determinations. Part IV analyzes whether depor-
tation proceedings implicate the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment. In Part V, the capacity of an immigrant child to
make a decision concerning his or her autonomy is addressed. Part VI
proposes a number of methods that courts and government may im-
plement to protect the rights of citizen children. This Article con-
cludes that the courts should adjudicate issues that threaten to deprive
a person of "all that makes life worth living"9 and, furthermore, that
the Supreme Court should protect constitutional rights in a manner
consistent with its prior controlling decisions.
H. The Tradition of the American Family: Substantive Due
Process Analysis
A. The Protection Traditionally Granted by the Courts to Family
Relationships
In a recent United States Supreme Court case, Michael H. v. Ger-
ald D.,1 Justice Scalia set forth an analysis for deciding what liberty
interests merit constitutional protection." Writing for the plurality,
Justice Scalia rejected Michael's claim that his paternal interest was
protectable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 Justice Scalia found,
in construing the Due Process Clause, that the "interest denominated
as a 'liberty' [must] be 'fundamental', (a concept that, in isolation, is
hard to objectify), but also that it [must] be an interest traditionally
protected by our society."'1 3 In an eloquent dissent Justice Brennan
9. Ng Fung Ho v. white, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
10. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether Califor-
nia's presumption of legitimacy for a child born to a married woman infringed upon the
due process rights of the biological father and daughter. Id. at 113. Michael H. was the
biological father of a child conceived and born to a married woman living with her hus-
band. Id. at 115-16.
11. I at 122.
12. IS at 119.
13. Id. at 122.
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maintained that Justice Scalia had interpreted tradition too narrowly
and argued that the Court should focus not upon the historical treat-
ment of men who beget children by having adulterous affairs with
married women, but "whether parenthood is an interest that histori-
cally has received our attention and protection.
14
In response, Justice Scalia announced his methodology for defin-
ing a tradition. In footnote six of the opinion, he writes, "Though the
dissent has no basis for the level of generality it would select, we do:
We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition pro-
tecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified." 5
Even under this analysis, notwithstanding its narrow construction
of tradition, it may be argued that United States citizen children are
deprived of a fundamental liberty interest if their parents are de-
ported from the United States. 6
Justice Scalia's inquiry asks whether there is a specific tradition of
protection for the right being asserted.1 7 If such a tradition exists,
then the Court deems the right fundamental, and abridgment of that
right is subject to a strict level of scrutiny. As Justice Scalia wrote in
Michael H.:
As we have put it, the Due Process Clause affords only those
protections "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental." Our cases reflect "con-
tinual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history [and]
solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our soci-
ety ....
Justice Scalia refused to expand the definition of "family" to in-
lude the biological father of a child whose mother was married to
another man.' 9 Scalia reasoned that the expansion of the notion of
"unitary family" beyond "marital" family or "the household of unmar-
14. IL at 139. (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a strong criticism of Scalia's narrow view
of tradition, see Steven R. Greenberger, Justice Scalia's Due Process Traditionalism Ap-
plied to Territorial Jurisdiction: The Illusion of Adjudication Without Judgment, 33 B.C. L.
Rnv. 981 (1992). See also L. Benjamin Young, Jr., Justice Scalia's History and Tradition:
The Chief Nightmare in Professor Tribe's Anxiety Closet, 78 VA. L. Rnv. 581 (1992).
15. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6.
16. Although the statute at issue in Michael H. is a state statute tested for substantive
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Fifth Amendment, the funda-
mental analysis is the same. For purposes of this paper, the substantive due process analy-
sis applies to both state and federal statutes.
17. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127.
18. Id. at 122-23 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) and Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
19. Id. at 131.
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tied parents and their children" would "bear no resemblance to tradi-
tionally respected relationships."20  Scalia's two-pronged inquiry
looked first to historical support for the asserted right, and second to
the extant modem decisions and legislation.
Where a citizen child faces state-imposed separation from his par-
ents, Justice Scalia's idea of tradition mandates the recognition of a
fundamental right. The family relationship has been constitutionally
protected since the early 1920s. In Meyer v. Nebraska,21 the Court
stated that the concept of liberty included "the right of the individual
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, marry, to establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his [life]."'' In
1925 in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,.- the Court acknowledged the
unique protections extended to parents and children under the Consti-
tution.24 In Pierce, the Court stated, "The child is not the mere crea-
ture of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."'
5
Over the years, the Court has determined which rights among
family relationships warrant constitutional protection. 26 The Court
has recognized the right to decide whether to procreate,27 the right to
use contraceptives,28 the right of an unwed father to retain custody of
his illegitimate children 9 and the right to live with extended family. 0
Lower courts have recognized additional family rights that war-
rant constitutional protection. In Prisco v. United States,3' the court
noted that "[in a long line of cases extending over sixty-five years, the
Supreme Court has held that the parent-child relationship is protected
as a matter of substantive due process.' 32 Regardless of how far the
courts have expanded this penumbra of rights, its core philosophy has
20. Id. at 123 n.3.
21. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
22. Id at 399.
23. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
24. Id.
25. Id at 535.
26. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992).
27. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
28. Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
29. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
30. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
31. 851 F.2d 93 (3rd Cir. 1988).
32. Id at 97.
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remained intact; the right of family association is a significant interest
in fundamental rights jurisprudence. Any state action that potentially
affects such rights should be analyzed under the strict scrutiny test.
33
Severance of the relationship between a parent and his child will
survive constitutional scrutiny only if... (a) the asserted gov-
ernmental interest [is] compelling; (b) there [is] a particularized
showing that the state interest in question would be promoted
by terminating the relationship; (c) it [is] impossible to achieve
the goal in question through any means less restrictive of the
rights of parent and child; and (d) the affected parties [are] ac-
corded the procedural protections mandated by the Due Process
Clauses.M
As the court in Sims v. State Department of Public Welfare35 stated,
"[i]t is now clear that there is a fundamental right emanating from the
Constitution, which protects the integrity of the family unit from un-
warranted intrusions by the state."'36 The importance of the tradi-
tional family to our country's heritage and the precedent of protecting
the traditional family strongly suggests that a fundamental right to the
companionship of one's family does or should exist.
B. Children Have A Fundamental Right To The Companionship of
Their Parents
While most family rights decisions have addressed parents' rights,
the Court of Appeals in Franz held that a child has a constitutionally
protected interest in the companionship of his or her parent.37
Franz's wife and children were relocated through the Federal
Witness Protection Program. Franz sued the United States, the De-
partment of Justice, and the Attorney General for declaratory relief
and monetary damages. The District Court held that the father failed
to state a claim.3 8 The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Franz
had stated a cause of action against the administrator of the witness
protection program for abrogation of father's and children's "constitu-
tionally protected rights.., to one another's companionship. '3 9 Ac-
cording to the appellate court, the administrator could not infringe
upon these rights "without (1) affording the father requisite proce-
dural protections, (2) making a... showing of a legitimate state inter-
33. Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
34. Ma at 602.
35. 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
36. Id. at 1190.
37. Franz, 707 F.2d at 586.
38. Id at 585.
39. Id at 586.
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est sufficient to justify the infringement, or (3) availing themselves of
equally effective alternative solutions... that would have been less
restrictive of the [father's and children's] rights."4
The appellate court further stated that "[it is beyond dispute that
'freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental
liberty interest' protected by the Constitution. '41 The court declared
that "[a]mong the most important of the liberties accorded this spe-
cial treatment [that of recognition as a fundamental right] is the free-
dom of a parent and child to maintain, cultivate, and mold their
ongoing relationship." 42 The court held that to avoid unnecessary in-
fringement of fundamental rights, the government must make a "par-
ticularized showing of advantage in every case in which it
contemplates depriving someone of constitutionally protected
interests. 43
The court in Franz considered three factors in its determination
of the validity of government action which interferes with parent-child
relations. The court first considered that parents in the United States
"historically have participated heavily in the rearing of their chil-
dren."44 Furthermore, this country holds the belief that "parents have
a right to maintain contact with and shape the development of their
children."45 The court then stated that protecting the relationships
between parents and children facilitates the socialization of children
and ensures diversity and pluralism in the country's culture.' Most
significantly, however, the court recognized "the profound importance
of the bond between a parent and a child"'4 7 and stated that a child's
"right to protection from interference in the relationship derives from
the psychic importance to him of being raised by a loving, responsive,
reliable adult."
'48
Where a parent is subject to deportation, a child's interests
should be afforded at least the same consideration as those where a
parent is enrolled in the Witness Protection Program. Both programs
are under the direction of the Attorney General. While the court in
Franz found no language requiring consideration of the impact of the
40. Id.
41. Id. at 594 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
42. Id. at 595.
43. Id. at 606 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 597.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 599.
48. Id.
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admission of a witness to the program on family members, neverthe-
less the court considered the impact upon family members an impor-
tant factor in determining the constitutionality of the relocation.49
Strict scrutiny should be applied to the suspension of deportation
hearings even in the absence of administrative language mandating
attention to the effect of state action on third parties. The Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service ("INS") could easily meet the consti-
tutional criteria of the Franz court by applying strict scrutiny review to
deportations which may interfere with parent-child relationships.
The Franz court's position that the child's interest in the parent-
child relationship deserves the same constitutional protection as the
parent's interest is supported by earlier Supreme Court decisions. In
re Gaul5 0 and Bellotti v. Baird,51 established that a minor's fundamen-
tal rights generally merit as much constitutional protection as those of
an adult.5 2 The Southern District of Texas followed this view in Sims
v. State Department of Public Welfare.53 In Sims, the court stated,
In a suit for the involuntary termination of parental rights, the
child's interest is generally distinct from that of either the State
or the parents. The interest of the state and the interest of the
child differ in such a manner that they must be assumed to be
adverse until there has been a final adjudication on the merits.54
Subsequent cases have reinforced the notion that children and
parents have a protectable interest in the continuation of the parent-
child relationship. Myres v. Rask,55 for example, held that parents had
a constitutionally protected right to the companionship and support of
their children, and thus were allowed to bring a civil rights action for
the wrongful death of their child.56 Although the court in Baldwin v.
Ledbetter57 maintained that the interest of a child in the support and
nurture of his or her parent is not a liberty interest which has explicitly
been recognized "as protected by the Due Process clause, . . . 'we
cannot avoid applying the force and rationale of these precedents to
the family choice involved in this case."'
58
49. Id at 597.
50. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
51. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
52. Gault 387 U.S. at 13; Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635.
53. 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
54. Id at 1194.
55. 602 F. Supp. 210 (D. Colo. 1985).
56. Id at 213.
57. 647 F. Supp. 623 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
58. Id at 638 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977)).
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C. The Effect of Parents' Wrongdoing on the Child's Ability To
Assert A Fundamental Family Right
Where wrongdoing on the part of the parent triggers state action,
government cannot automatically disenfranchise the child from his or
her fundamental family rights. It is a basic concept of due process that
one should not suffer a deprivation of liberty due to the arbitrary act
of the government.5 9 Penalizing children for the acts of their parents
by refusing to honor the child's constitutional rights clearly denies es-
sential values inherent in our judicial system.
In White v. Rochford, ° children brought a civil rights action
against police officers for leaving them in a car on a freeway after
their uncle was arrested for drag racing.61 Appellant children
charged, inter alia, the state with interfering with their right to liberty
and family integrity.62 The court relied on Meyer v. Nebraska,63 Pierce
v. Society of Sisters," and Skinner v. Oklahoma65 to hold that the chil-
dren's complaint stated a cause of action and that their substantive
due process rights had been violated.66 The court stated that it was
"difficult to believe that this relationship [was] any less harmed by
depriving children of adult care and stranding them on a freeway than
by controlling school curricula." 67
The dissent argued that "it was the uncle's illegal activities that
caused the children to be stranded, not any actions by the police."'
The majority opinion found this approach overbroad and noted the
danger of allowing the state to use a "you brought this on yourself"
justification for constitutional violations.69 Similarly, citizen children
of illegal immigrants have no control over their parents' actions. They
are not the wrongdoers, and yet they are penalized as if they were
responsible for their parents' behavior.
59. "Due process of law [as referred to in the Fifth Amendment] refers to that law of
the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress
by the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed...
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884) (emphasis added).
60. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
61. Id. at 382.
62. Id. at 383.
63. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
64. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
65. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
66. White, 592 F.2d at 383 n.1.
67. Id
68. Id. at 389 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting).
69. Id.
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Plyler v. Doe7 ° also stands for the proposition that children
should not be penalized for their parents' acts.71 In this 1982 decision,
the United States Supreme Court stated that children may not be pun-
ished for parental behavior beyond their control. 2 In perhaps the
most frequently-cited portion of Justice Brennan's opinion, the Court
held that "[e]ven if the State found it expedient to control the conduct
of adults by acting against their children, legislation directing the onus
of a parent's misconduct against his children does not comport with
fundamental conceptions of justice."73
In Plyler, the Court reviewed a statute that withheld state funds
for the education of children who were in the United States illegally.74
The statute also authorized the school districts to deny enrollment to
these children.7 5 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Plyler,
conceded that the state may withhold certain benefits from those who
are in the United States illegally as a product of their own conduct.76
Justice Brennan, however, emphasized that alien children require pro-
tection from the imposition of a "discriminatory burden on the basis
of a legal characteristic over which children can have little control.""
Justice Brennan recognized that lax enforcement of immigration laws,
combined with opportunities for the employment of undocumented
aliens, resulted in a "substantial 'shadow population' of illegal mi-
grants-numbering in the millions" who are encouraged to stay in the
United States as a source of cheap labor, but who are not afforded the
benefits offered to citizens. 78 The Court refused to define illegal
aliens as a suspect class because of their voluntary entry into this
country.79 Brennan's rationale is based on a child's lack of control
over the decisions parents make regarding residence.
Brennan said there are persuasive arguments that support the view
that a state may withhold benefits from residents who are in the
United States illegally.80
These arguments do not apply with the same force to classifica-
tions imposing disabilities on the minor children of such illegal
70. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
71. Id. at 220.
72. I&
73. Id.
74. Id. at 205 n.1.
75. Id. at 205.
76. Id. at 219, 228.
77. Id. at 220.
78. Id. at 218.
79. Id. at 219 n.19.
80. Id. at 225.
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entrants.... [Those who elect to enter our territory by stealth
and in violation of our law should be prepared to bear the con-
sequences .... But the children of those illegal entrants are not
comparably situated.81
The parents have the ability to follow the law and leave the coun-
try, but the children do not have this ability. The Texas statute in
question was directed against the children on the basis of a "legal
characteristic" over which they have no control.' Thus, Justice Bren-
nan concluded, it would be difficult to conceive of a rational justifica-
tion for penalizing these children for their presence within the United
States.83 In Plyler, the Court emphasized the fact that "education pro-
vides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically
productive lives to the benefit of us all," and that "education has a
fundamental role in maintaining the [basic] fabric of our society."8' In
addition, the Court discussed the effect that a deprivation of educa-
tion would have on a child: "[B]y depriving the children of any disfa-
vored group of an education, we foreclose the means by which that
group might raise the level of esteem in which it is held by the
majority."'
In his concurring opinion in Plyler, Justice Blackmun observed
that "[c]hildren [who are] denied an education are placed at a perma-
nent and insurmountable competitive disadvantage, for an unedu-
cated child is denied even the opportunity to achieve."8 6 Justice
Blackmun went on to state that the lack of education results in the
creation of a "discrete underclass."'  This language pervades virtually
every sentence of the concurrence. Justice Blackmun sees the unedu-
cated as relegated to a "second-class" existence, and states that the
right to an education "strike[s] at the heart of equal protection values
by involving the State in the creation of permanent class distinc-
tions."88 Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Plyler also expresses
concern over the vicarious punishment of innocent children. Justice
Powell states that "[t]hese children ... have been singled out for a
lifelong penalty and stigma," and that a legislative classification that
threatens to create "an underclass of future citizens and residents can-
81. Id at 219-20.
82. Id at 220.
83. Id
84. Id at 221.
85. Id at 222.
86. Id at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
87. Id
88. Id
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not be reconciled with one of the fundamental purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment."89
Chief Justice Burger dissented, stating that the Equal Protection
Clause does not prohibit legislation which distinguishes between
groups based on characteristics over which they can exert no influ-
ence.90 The Chief Justice stated that the Clause is designed to protect
"against arbitrary and irrational classifications... it is not an all-en-
compassing 'equalizer' designed to eradicate every distinction for
which persons are not 'responsible."' 91
This reasoning is only persuasive if one assumes that the classifi-
cation which deprives children of an education, based solely on par-
entage, is rational. Chief Justice Burger does not argue that denying a
non-citizen child an education promotes a state interest. Rather, he
relies, in part, on the Supreme Court's holding in San Antonio In-
dependent School District v. Rodriguez.92 The Court in Rodriguez up-
held a Texas statute which authorized an ad valorem tax by each
school district on property within the district.93 The tax supplemented
educational funds received from the state and resulted in substantial
differences in the per pupil expenditures in accordance with local tax
assessments. 94 Rodriguez can be distinguished in that under the Texas
statute, an education was provided to all children. In Plyler, however,
children of illegal aliens faced a total deprivation of education.9" In
Rodriguez, Justice Powell stressed that the appellants' contention was
not that the lack of personal resources brought about an absolute dep-
rivation, but rather that children residing in poor districts received a
lesser quality education than children residing in wealthier school dis-
tricts.96 He further added that the "Equal Protection Clause does not
require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages,"' and that no
system can assure precise equality in education because of the infinite
variables affecting the educational process.98 Plyler, on the other
hand, did not address "absolute equality." Plyler, instead, addressed
89. Id. at 238-39 (Powell, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 245.
92. Id. at 247 (relying on San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973)).
93. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 9.
94. Id. at 1.
95. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205.
96. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23.
97. Id. at 24.
98. Id
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absolute deprivation of a right. Thus, the Court in Plyler analyzed the
Equal Protection Clause with a greater degree of scrutiny.
In Plyler, the Court also stressed the importance of education in
enabling an individual to successfully function in society. The major-
ity and dissenting opinions both emphasize advancement on the basis
of individual merit, and the inherent opportunity in education to raise
one's self esteem which inculcates "fundamental values necessary to
the maintenance of a democratic political system." 99 Yet the Court
did not apply strict scrutiny to the Texas statute in Plyler.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals held that it was un-
necessary to decide whether the statute would survive strict scrutiny
because the discrimination embodied in the statute would not survive
rational basis review. 00 The Supreme Court conceded that public ed-
ucation is not a fundamental right granted by the Constitution, and
that alienage is not a suspect class. Yet, the Court applied the inter-
mediate scrutiny test because public education is more than a mere
"benefit" conferred by the government, and because undocumented
children are a "discrete class of children not accountable for their dis-
abling status."''
The discussion in Plyler focused upon the disadvantages that re-
sult from the deprivation of education. The holding specifically ap-
plied to children who share the undocumented status of their
parents.102 The judiciary extended this line of reasoning in public
assistance cases to citizen children whose parents are undocu-
mented.10 3 The rationale in Plyler, however, has failed to reach the
sphere of immigration law.
The principle of Plyler, which prohibited the government from
depriving alien children of the non-fundamental right to an education,
should be extended to protect the fundamental rights of citizen chil-
dren to live with their parents. To fail to do so is to punish these
citizen children by refusing to enforce their constitutional rights.
The need to recognize a child's fundamental right to the compan-
ionship of his or her parents is supported by Franz v. United States.
1' 4
Under Franz, state interference adversely affecting a child's funda-
mental right to companionship cannot be justified absent a showing
99. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)).
100. Id. at 208.
101. Id. at 220, 223.
102. Id. at 229.
103. Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1977); Doe v. Miller, 573 F. Supp. 461
(N.D. Ill. 1983); Darces v. Woods, 679 P.2d 458 (Cal. 1984).
104. 707 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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that the parents are unfit to care for their offspring.105 The court ac-
knowledged that the state may sever the bond between parent and
child if the parent neglects the child. 6 Nonetheless, without a show-
ing that the parents' behavior harms their child, state action cannot
violate the child's fundamental rights unless it is established that the
action is the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling end.107
In most suspension of deportation cases, the parents and children
enjoy a normal, healthy and loving relationship.108 Unless the state
can show that the parents are unfit, the deportation should be re-
viewed under a strict scrutiny standard. Where the state can show a
valid parens patrite justification for separation of parent and child, the
child's constitutional rights would not be violated because the state
would be acting in the best interests of the child. To substantially af-
fect the parent-child relationship without compelling reason, however,
is clearly a violation of the child's rights.
I. Procedural Due Process and the Right of Children to
Parental Companionship
A. The Failure of the Courts to Apply the General Rule of
Protection of Rights for the Citizen Child in the
Immigration Context
1. The Role of the Court in Immigration Proceedings
Not long ago, a citizen child had virtually no remedy for a deter-
mination of the deportability of his or her parents. 0 9 The Attorney
General has not always had the power to suspend a deportation pro-
ceeding. Prior to 1940, an alien's only remedy was to appeal directly
to Congress.' 10 The 1952 version of the INA gave the Attorney Gen-
eral the power to suspend deportation if the alien could demonstrate
"exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.""'
105. Id. at 604.
106. Id
107. Id.
108. It has been the author's experience when practicing immigration law that all of the
members of the family appeared to constitute a closely united family.
109. In 1917 Congress passed the first comprehensive revision of the immigration laws.
Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874 (1917). Section 19 required the
deportation of all aliens who were in the United States in violation of the Act. It. at 897.
For a historical reference to suspension of deportation see Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217,
222-26 (1963).
110. Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, § 20, 54 Stat. 670, 672 (1940).
111. INA, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 244(a)(1), 66 Stat. 163,214 (1952) (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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Statutory relief is now available which allows a deportable alien
to suspend the deportation proceedings when certain specific condi-
tions are satisfied. 8 U.S.C. section 1254(a)(1)" 2 provides that the At-
torney General may suspend deportation and adjust the status of an
otherwise deportable alien who: (1) has been physically present in the
United States for not less than seven years; (2) is a person of good
moral character; and (3) is a person whose deportation would, in the
opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the
alien or his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United
States or an alien admitted for permanent residence.
1 13
The first and second statutory requirements are "findings of fact"
and must be "supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evi-
dence on the record considered as a whole. 11 14 The third statutory
requirement, extreme hardship, is at the discretion of the Attorney
General, and is not determined by an objective standard." 5 The "ex-
treme hardship" provision is problematic because the term is not de-
fined by the INS and the courts have declined to meaningfully review
the Attorney General's discretion in its interpretation. While the
Supreme Court in INS v. Jong Ha Wang 16 expressly stated that "[t]he
crucial question in this case is what constitutes 'extreme hardship,"'117
it has never attempted to define the term. Thereafter, with respect to
the words "extreme hardship," the Court observed that "the Act com-
mits [this] definition in the first instance to the Attorney General and
his delegates""' and they "have the authority to construe 'extreme
hardship' narrowly should they deem it wise to do so.""'
Lower courts seem to agree that Jong Ha Wang is inconsistent
with prior federal courts of appeals decisions which held that determi-
nations of extreme hardship were reviewable under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1105(a)(4) to the same extent as under § 1254(a)(1). 2 ° Because the
Attorney General, under Jong Ha Wang, has the power to define "ex-
treme hardship," lower courts seem hesitant to substantively review
determinations of "extreme hardship."'' At the same time, lower
112. (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (amending INA § 244(a)(1) (1952)).
113. Id.
114. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(4) (1992).
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
116. 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (per curiam).
117. I£ at 144.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 145.
120. See infra note 399.
121. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. at 145. See Hernandez-Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558,561-
62 (5th Cir. 1987).
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courts do not believe that Jong Ha Wang foreclosed ali review in this
area.'" The federal courts of appeals, when reviewing allegations of
extreme hardship, believe "that judicial review remains available to
ensure that an alien, denied relief [of a suspension of deportationlex-
treme hardship determination,] ... has had a fair and full considera-
tion of his claims.'- 23 Wang was decided according to classic lines of
limited judicial review, following the principle of "plenary power" and
deferring to other branches of government as illustrated in Fiallo v.
Bell."2 The United States Supreme Court discussed the limited scope
of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation in Fiallo. The Court,
addressing the issue of whether the father of an illegitimate child qual-
ifies as a parent under the INA, stated that "'over no conceivable sub-
ject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over'
the admission of aliens."' Furthermore, Justice Powell, author of the
majority opinion in Fiallo, wrote that "in the exercise of its broad
power over immigration and naturalization, 'Congress regularly
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.""126 In
Fiallo, the Court specifically stated that it had no judicial authority to
substitute a political judgment for that of Congress, and that the de-
nial of preferential status to certain parents is a "policy question en-
trusted exclusively to the political branches of our government."'127
Therefore, the burden currently rests with the alien to demonstrate
statutory eligibility and equitable justifications for the exercise of dis-
cretion by the INS.
The dissatisfaction with the holding in Fiallo was readily apparent
when, shortly thereafter, the Ninth Circuit decided Palmer v.
Reddy.'28 One way to circumvent the harsh consequences of Fiallo is
to have a stepmother petition for her husband's illegitimate child. In
order to approve the petition, the Board of Immigration Appeals
("BIA") requires a stepparent to show "an interest in the stepchild's
welfare prior to that child's eighteenth birthday.' 29 The stepmother
can demonstrate an interest in the child by either "permitting the child
to live in the family home and caring for him as a parent, or... by
122. Jara-Navarrete v. INS, 813 F.2d 1340, 1342 (9th Cir. 1987).
123. Ramos v. INS, 695 F.2d 181, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1983).
124. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
125. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (quoting Oceanic Navigation v. Stranaham, 214 U.S. 320,
339 (1909)).
126. Id at 792 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976)).
127. Id at 798.
128. 622 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1980).
129. In re Moreira, 17 I. & N. Dec. 41, 46 (BIA 1979).
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demonstrating an active parental interest in the child's support, in-
struction and general welfare."1 0 The requirement of "active paren-
tal interest" was entirely eliminated by the Ninth Circuit in Palmer.131
In Palmer, the court literally construed the stepchild provision of the
INA, and only required a valid marriage to the natural parent.132
Although it is questionable whether this interpretation is consistent
with congressional intent to reunify families, it clearly helps fathers,
such as the one involved in in re MacMillan,33 bring their children
into America. 34
Congress finally addressed the harsh consequences of Fiallo in
1986 when Congress passed section 315 of the Immigration Reform
and Control Act ("IRCA"), amending the. definition of a child in INA
section 101(b)(1)(D).' 3s The new provision extends the definition of a
child to include an illegitimate child by virtue of his or her relationship
to the natural father.
The harsh effects of Jong Ha Wang have not been corrected in a
similar fashion. On the contrary, in INS v. Doherty'36 the Court af-
firmed that a denial of a motion to reopen deportation is only subject
to review for abuse of discretion. 37 In Doherty, the Court upheld the
Attorney General's denial of an alien's motion to reopen deportation
130. Id. at 47.
131. Palmer, 622 F.2d at 464.
132. Id.
133. 17 L & N. Dec. 605 (BIA 1981). In in re MacMillan
the beneficiaries, twin brothers, were born in London, England, on July 26, 1962,
to the petitioner's husband and a woman who was not then and never became his
wife. The beneficiaries' natural mother abandoned them when they were infants
and they have since resided with their paternal grandmother in Grenada, West
Indies.
Id. The BIA reluctantly decided to construe § 101(b)(1)(B) in accordance with Palmer v.
Reddy. This literal interpretation of § 101(b)(1)(B), by the Ninth Circuit, rendered the
beneficiaries stepchildren of the petitioner, entitling them to immediate relative status. Id.
at 606-07.
134. Id.
135. This part of the statute provides:
(b) As used in subchapters I and H1 of this chapter-
(1) The term "child" means an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age
who is... (D) an illegitimate child, by, through whom, or on whose behalf a
status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the relationship of the chid to its
natural mother or to its natural father if the father has or had a bona fide parent-
child relationship with the person.
INA, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101, 66 Stat. 163, (1952) (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (Supp. V 1993)).
136. 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992).
137. Id, at 720.
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in an attempt to apply for asylum and withholding of deportation. 138
The Court held that the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion
even though a decision to withhold deportation is mandatory.
1 39
Thus, under the holding of Doherty, even if Congress rewrote 8 U.S.C.
section 1254 to require the Attorney General to grant suspension of
deportation under specified circumstances, a motion to reopen could
still be denied, and would be upheld absent an abuse of discretion.
This anomaly was pointed out by Justice Scalia who, partly dis-
senting in Doherty, explained that "[b]ecause of the mandatory nature
of the withholding-of-deportation provision, the Attorney General's
power to deny requests withholding claims differs significantly from
his broader authority to administer discretionary forms of relief such
as asylum and suspension of deportation."14 °
As a result of the Court's holding in Doherty, a denial of a motion
to reopen deportation in order to request a withholding of deporta-
tion may constitute a violation of our international obligations. In
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,"41 the Court recognized that the mandatory
duty imposed by 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) parallels the United States
mandatory non refoulment provision under Article 33.1 of the United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 42 Article
33.1 of the Convention, which is subject to certain exceptions, pro-
vides: "No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refu-
gee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.
1 4 3
In comparison, 8 U.S.C. section 1253(h)(1) states: "The Attorney
General shall not deport or return any alien (other than an alien de-
scribed in section 1251(a)(4)(D) of this title) to a country if the Attor-
ney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in such county on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."'
44
In the suspension of deportation context, there is no mandatory
provision that requires the Attorney General to grant relief. Nor is
138. Id at 722.
139. Id at 725. The Court came to this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that asylum,
like extreme hardship, can be determined at the discretion of the Attorney General. Id
140. Id at 729 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141. 480 U.S. 421, 428-29 (1987).
142. 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6267; 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176 (1954).
143. Id
144. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
Winter 1995] DEPORTATION OF AMERICAN CHILDREN
there a treaty ratified by the United States that requires granting re-
lief. A denial of a motion to reopen a request for suspension of de-
portation, however, may violate fundamental rights of a United States
citizen.
In order to understand the impact of Jong Ha Wang, it is neces-
sary to understand two separate situations which implicate suspension
of deportation hearings. The first situation is one in which aliens at
their original deportation hearing are eligible for suspension and re-
quest suspension to be granted on the merits. The second, and more
frequent situation, involves an alien who is ineligible for suspension at
the time of the original deportation hearing because he or she has not
demonstrated seven years of continued physical presence in the
United States, or does not have a United States citizen child. A typi-
cal example of the second scenario involves an alien who requests vol-
untary departure but does not leave the country. Upon eligibility, the
alien files a motion to reopen the deportation proceedings in order to
request the substantive relief of deportation suspension.145
Motions to reopen immigration proceedings are disfavored for
the same reasons that petitions for rehearing and motions for a new
trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence are disfavored.146 This
is especially true in a deportation proceeding where, as a general mat-
ter, each delay works to the advantage of a deportable alien who
wishes to merely remain in the United States. 47 Motions to reopen
are couched in the negative 48 and are subjected to inconsistent stan-
dards of review. These inconsistencies were put to rest in INS v.
Abudu'49 and INS v. Doherty.'50 This very limited standard of review
145. The Immigration Act of 1990 amended 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) of the INA by providing
that an alien, granted voluntary departure, who remains in the United States after the
scheduled date of departure other than for exceptional circumstances, shall not be eligible
for certain types of relief.
146. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 107 (1988).
147. See, eg., INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 450 (1985).
148. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 provides in part:
Motions to reopen in deportation proceedings shall not be granted unless it ap-
pears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not
available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing;
nor shall any motion to reopen for the purpose of affording the alien an opportu-
nity to apply for any form of discretionary relief be granted ... unless the relief is
sought on the basis of circumstances which have arisen subsequent to the hearing.
8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1994).
149. According to the Court in INS v. Abudu:
There are at least three independent grounds on which the BIA may deny a mo-
tion to reopen. First, it may hold that the movant has not established a prima
facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought. The standard of review of
such a denial is not before us today.... Second, the BIA may hold that the
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for statutory eligibility, as well as for discretionary decisions, makes
this procedure burdensome for the alien and is likely to produce situa-
tions in which the constitutional rights of the citizen child are violated
without the procedural safeguards of a hearing.
To compound the problem, Jong Ha Wang has been applied to
both the substantive and procedural aspects of this avenue of relief.'51
Little attention is given to the fact that a substantive decision to grant
suspension avoids deportation and confers lawful permanent resi-
dency. In contrast, a decision to reopen grants the alien only an evi-
dentiary hearing at which he or she will have the opportunity to prove
the facts necessary for suspension (and for a temporary stay of
deportation).
2. What Constitutes Extreme Hardship
While the Supreme Court stated that the "words [extreme hard-
ship] are not self-explanatory,"'152 no case has yet defined the term
precisely. The BIA has defined situations that do not constitute ex-
treme hardship.'53 "The mere fact that an alien's child is born in the
movant has not introduced previously unavailable, material evidence, 8 CFR § 3.2
(1987), or, in an asylum application case, that the movant has not reasonably ex-
plained his failure to apply for asylum initially, 8 CFR § 208.11 (1987). ... We
decide today that the appropriate standard of review of such denials is abuse of
discretion. Third, in cases in which the ultimate grant of relief is discretionary...
the BIA may leap ahead, as it were, over the two threshold concerns (prima facie
case and new evidence/reasonable explanation), and simply determine that even
if they were met, the movant would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of
relief. We have consistently held that denials on this third ground are subject to
an abuse-of-discretion standard.
485 U.S. at 104-05. See also INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444 (1985) (suspension of depor-
tation); INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976) (adjustment of status).
150. See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
151. In Jong Ha Wang, there appear to be two interconnected issues: (a) whether the
BIA should have reopened the deportation proceeding, and (b) whether the aliens had
demonstrated extreme hardship. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 139 (1981). Thus,
Jong Ha Wang is applied to both procedural and substantive aspects of judicial review in
suspension cases. For example, Jong Ha Wang is routinely cited for the proposition that
courts should exercise restraint in ordering the BIA to reopen deportation proceedings.
See, e.g., Mesa v. INS, 726 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 1984) (stating the Board's decision not to
reopen must be accepted by a court unless arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of power). It
is also regularly read to mean that the agency "has considerable discretion to decide what
constitutes 'extreme hardship."' Luna v. INS, 709 F.2d 126, 127 (1st Cir. 1983). Thus Jong
Ha Wang broadly controls not only cases involving motions to reopen but also direct ap-
peals from denials of suspension.
152. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. at 144.
153. In a recent BIA interim decision, the BIA reviewed the factors that do not consti-
tute extreme hardship:
While the political and economic conditions in the alien's homeland are rele-
vant, they do not justify a grant of relief unless other factors such as advanced age
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United States does not entitle the alien to any favored status in seek-
ing discretionary relief from deportation."'154 Economic loss alone
does not constitute extreme hardship, but it is a factor to be consid-
ered in determining eligibility for suspension of deportation.' 5  The
Third Circuit's reasoning is that "to hold otherwise would open the
doors to permanent residence in the United States to any citizen of an
underdeveloped country who could get here.' 5 6 Claims of inade-
quate medical care, educational systems, and lower standards of living
have also been held insufficient by the courts to establish extreme
hardship.' 5 7 Economic difficulties combined with the fact that two
children who have spent their lives in the United States and speak
only English will be forced to live in the Philippines is also insuffi-
cient."5 Even a claim that deportation would impose severe eco-
nomic hardship upon petitioners' children because of the
unavailability of employment in the foreign country has not created a
prima facie showing of extreme hardship. 9
Thus, the term "extreme hardship" as it is presently, albeit
vaguely, defined provides practically unattainable relief for the citizen
child whose parents are subject to deportation. The Attorney General
and his delegates retain an immense amount of power because they
are not required to define the term clearly. Furthermore, the limited
scope of judicial review in these cases burdens the citizen child who
suffers a loss of rights.
or severe illness combine with economic detriment to make deportation ex-
tremely hard on the alien or his qualifying relative. Economic detriment in the
absence of other substantial equities is not extreme hardship. Even a significant
reduction in the standard of living is not by itself a ground for relief. The loss of a
job and the concomitant financial loss incurred does not rise to the level of ex-
treme hardship. Similarly, the readjustment of an alien to life in his native coun-
try after having spent a number of years in the United States is not the type of
hardship that is characterized as extreme, since similar hardship is suffered by
most aliens who have spent time abroad.
In re IGE, No. 3230, 1994 BIA LEXIS 13 (BIA Sept. 16, 1994).
154. Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 1980).
155. Barrera-Leyva v. INS, 637 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1980).
156. Acosta v. Gafney, 558 F.2d 1153, 1157 (3d Cir. 1977).
157. Barrera-Leyva, 637 F.2d at 643-44.
158. Id at 644.
159. "In at least one case, however, we distinguished between inability to find compara-
ble employment and inability to find any employment, suggesting that the inability to se-
cure any employment constitutes more than mere economic detriment." Id. at 643 (citing
Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 676 (9th Cir. 1968)) (emphasis added).
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B. From Extreme Hardship to Extreme Deference
Many scholars take different positions regarding the proper role
of judicial review over agency determinations. Regardless of point of
view, there is consensus that judicial review of most agency action is
an essential safeguard against abuses of agency authority. 60 There is
also consensus that judicial intervention can undermine agency effec-
tiveness.161 The difficulty lies in distinguishing between the situations
in which a court should supply an independent statutory hearing from
the situations in which a court should accept any reasonable interpre-
tation by the agency.
The Supreme Court applies a two-step test for judicial review of
agency statutory interpretation. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. Justice Stevens, for a unanimous Court,
articulated this two-step approach:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spo-
ken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress .... If, however, the court determines that Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construction on the stat-
ute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute. 62
In the second step of Chevron, the Court distinguished between two
different situations:
[(1)] If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to eluci-
date a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legis-
lative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute. [(2)
When Congress has not intentionally left a gap,] a court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a rea-
sonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.1
63
160. See, e.g., Louis L. JAFFE, JuDiCiAL CONTROL OF A m NxsTRAiivE AcioN 321
(1965).
161. Id at 321-22.
162. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
163. Id. at 843-33 (footnotes omitted).
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The Court cited Jong Ha Wang as an example of the latter situation.164
The delegation rationale of Chevron, however, is intimately related to
the question of extreme deference given to agency determinations in
immigration law. Specifically, a determination of "extreme hardship"
in the context of suspension of deportation, committed by the INA to
the Attorney General's discretion, creates an ambiguity or silence.
The factors that create "extreme hardship" are not defined. Thus, the
second step of the Chevron test, implicit delegation by Congress, is
triggered. In other words, a superficial reading of Chevron indicates
that Congress has delegated both policy formation and construction of
rules required to fill any gaps to the Attorney General, justifying a
highly deferential attitude by the courts.
165
As one commentator pointed out, the Chevron standard is "fully
consistent with traditional principles of judicial review.' 1 66 Courts re-
tained their authority, first recognized by Chief Justice Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison,67 to "say what the law is."" This authority is
reinforced by Chevron, which specifically states that "[t]he judiciary is
the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional
intent."'1 69 This notion of deference is supported by Justice Scalia:
It is not immediately apparent why a court should ever accept
the judgment of an executive agency on a question of law. In-
deed, on its face the suggestion seems quite incompatible with
Marshall's aphorism that "[ilt is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Surely
the law, that immutable product of Congress, is what it is, and its
content-ultimately to be decided by the courts-cannot be al-
tered or affected by what the Executive thinks about it. I sup-
pose it is harmless enough to speak about "giving deference to
the views of the Executive" concerning the meaning of a statute,
just as we speak of "giving deference to the views of the Con-
164. Id at 844.
165. Chevron is the last of a long line of cases to give significant deference to adminis-
trative agencies, leading some commentators to believe that Chevron altered the scope of
review. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind the
Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 4 (1990); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the
Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 CoLum. L. REv. 452, 460-61 (1989). It
appears, however, that these statements have exaggerated the importance of Chevron.
"Chevron's rhetoric, though it seemed bold, was hardly revolutionary." Russell L. Weaver,
Some Realism About Chevron 58 Mo. L. Rnv. 129, 135-36 (1993).
166. Weaver, supra note 165, at 137.
167. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
168. Id. at 177.
169. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,843
& n.9 (1984).
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gress" concerning the constitutionality of particular legislation-
the mealy-mouthed word "deference" not necessarily meaning
anything more than considering those views with attentiveness
and profound respect, before we reject them. But to say that
those views, if at least reasonable, will ever be binding-that is
seemingly, a striking abdication of judicial responsibility. 170
The same idea is reflected by Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in a
more recent Supreme Court decision: "[D]eference is not abdication,
and it requires us to accept only those agency interpretations that are
reasonable in the light of the principles of construction courts nor-
mally employ."
17 '
The principle that deference depends upon congressional delega-
tion does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that statutory ambigu-
ity alone establishes such delegation. It is one thing to find express
congressional delegation in the form of legislative rule making author-
ity. It is quite another to assume that ambiguity or silence constitutes
such a delegation.
172
While certain factors, such as inherently broad statutory language
and the perceived expertise of the agency suggest that delegation is
appropriate, the courts have identified danger signals that indicate
that deference to the agency is less appropriate. One of these danger
signals is the presence of a constitutional issue.173 This danger signal
is based on the well-recognized principle that the courts will construe
statutes to avoid passing on constitutional issues.174
Because courts generally require clear statements of congres-
sional intent to reach such constitutional issues, agency interpretations
that raise constitutional questions are less likely to merit deference.175
The issue of deference is particularly important in the area of im-
migration law since courts have traditionally deferred to the political
branch of government that has expertise in immigration, the BIA.
This Article exhibited that the determination of extreme hardship in
the suspension of deportation involves the constitutional rights of the
170. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DuKE L.J. 511, 513-14 (1989).
171. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
172. Eric M. Braun, Note, Coring The Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron
USA Inc., v. NRDC, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 986, 995 (1987).
173. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229, 247-48
(1985).
174. "[W]e ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality.... unless such adjudica-
tion is unavoidable." Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944).
175. Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in
The Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 892 (1982).
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citizen child.176 Judicial review of agency determinations may require
a de novo examination of the facts that implicate constitutional rights.
When the Supreme Court reviewed Jong Ha Wang, the constitu-
tional rights of petitioner's citizen children were not addressed. As
discussed earlier, the Court focused on whether petitioners had
presented a prima facie case that deportation would result in extreme
hardship to either themselves or their children, so as to entitle them to
discretionary relief under the Act.177 The Court stated that the crucial
issue of the case was determining what factors constitute "extreme
hardship.' 178 Although the Court never defined the term, it chided
the Ninth Circuit for "improvidently encroach[ing] on the authority
which the Act confers on the Attorney General and his delegates."'179
Although the issue of extreme hardship is committed to the dis-
cretion of the Attorney General, and although Jong Ha Wang was de-
cided three years before Chevron, the Court could have interpreted
the statute as consistent with the delegation rationale in Chevron, be-
cause Congress is likely to entrust constitutionally charged statutory
issues to the judiciary. "Agencies have little expertise in constitu-
tional interpretation and may have an institutional interest in the ex-
pansion of their authority."'8 °
Another danger signal also ignored by the Court in Jong Ha
Wang is agency interpretation of statutorily required procedures.'
The question in Jong Ha Wang boiled down to whether the alien par-
ents should be given a hearing in order to evaluate the merits of their
prima facie case for suspension of deportation1 s2 The Supreme Court
reminded the Ninth Circuit that motions to reopen were not in the
176. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
177. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 141 (1981).
178. Id. at 144.
179. Id. According to the Court:
Secondly, and more fundamentally, the Court of Appeals improvidently en-
croached on the authority which the Act confers on the Attorney General and his
delegates. The crucial question in this case is what constitutes "extreme hard-
ship." These words are not self-explanatory, and reasonable men could easily
differ as to their construction. But the Act commits their definition in the first
instance to the Attorney General and his delegates, and their construction and
application of this standard should not be overturned by a reviewing court simply
because it may prefer another interpretation of the statute.
IM.
180. Braun, supra note 172, at 1003.
181. JArFE, supra note 160, at 566. "Insofar as procedural questions involve estimates
of fairness, the judges are not only experts, but are free from the pressure on the adminis-
trator to realize his program." Id.
182. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. at 141.
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Act, but were drafted in the negative in the regulations. 83 The Court
chided the Ninth Circuit once more for "circumvent[ing] this aspect of
the regulation, which was obviously designed to permit the Board to
select for hearing only those motions reliably indicating the specific
recent events that would render deportation a matter of extreme
hardship for the alien or his children."'
It is unclear to what extent the Constitution requires independent
judicial review of agency determinations of fundamental interests.
Due process, however, may compel independent review for certain
types of rights not derived from the constitution.
The Supreme Court, in Ng-Fung Ho v. White1 5 made clear that
judicial review is necessary before a lawful resident alien who claims
to be a United States citizen can be deported. 8 6 In this case, the
Court was confronted with an act of Congress that ordered the depor-
tation of certain persons by executive order without a right to a judi-
cial hearing.' 87 Specifically, the Court stated:
To deport one who so claims to be a citizen, obviously deprives
him of liberty .... It may result also in loss of both property
and life; or of all that makes life worth living. Against the dan-
ger of such deprivation without the sanction afforded by judicial
proceedings, the Fifth Amendment affords protection in its
guarantee of due process of law. The difference in security of
judicial over administrative action has been adverted to by this
court.188
The mere possibility of deporting someone claiming United
States citizenship without a judicial hearing is constitutionally unac-
ceptable. Yet, this is exactly what happens to citizen children in sus-
pension of deportation cases. In particular, such Fifth Amendment
concerns arise where the BIA denies a motion to reopen, basing its
decision on the wide discretion of the Attorney General to determine
"extreme hardships," and the extreme deference that courts give that
decision.
C. Due Process and the Interest of the Child in the Determination of
"Extreme Hardship"
Thrning to the procedural due process rights of a citizen child in
the area of suspension of deportation, the enormous discretion
183. Id at 143.
184. Id
185. 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
186. Id at 284-85.
187. Id at 277.
188. Id at 284-85 (citations omitted).
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wielded by the Attorney General and the lack of an opportunity to
hear the child's concerns creates an irrebuttable presumption that the
deportation of the parents does not cause extreme hardship to the
child.
A good illustration is Hernandez-Cordero v. INS,189 in which the
respondents were a husband and wife, both citizens of Mexico who
had continuously resided in the United States since their marriage in
1975.190 They had four children.191 The three youngest were Ameri-
can citizens, ages eight, nine and eleven.19 The husband was self-em-
ployed and the wife was a homemaker.193 They built their own house
on a lot bought in 1983.194 Mr. Hernandez, through hard work and
thrift, accumulated assets totaling $70,000 by 1987.195 These assets in-
cluded their home, a motor vehicle, his tools, and a piece of fully paid,
unimproved real estate. 95 The respondents attempted to demon-
strate that extreme hardship would result from deportation. 97 As in
many suspension cases including Jong Ha Wang,198 there was ample
evidence that the Hernandezes were an exemplary family who had
worked hard to establish a life for themselves in the United States and
who would suffer devastating consequences if deported to Mexico. 99
The majority opinion referred to them as "honest, dependable
hardworking members of society" and stated that "[a]ny of us would
be happy to see them gain citizenship." 2°° While the children spoke
Spanish, they did not read or write in Spanish and each had entered
an American school.20 ' Respondents introduced affidavits from a psy-
chologist, who concluded the Hernandez family would suffer severe
emotional and psychological consequences if forced to return to Mex-
ico.202 An economist detailed the severe economic hardship that the
family would encounter, and six teachers described the serious educa-
189. 819 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).




194. Id. at 567.
195. Id at 568.
196. Id
197. Id. at 559.
198. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 139 (1981).
199. Hernandez-Cordero, 819 F.2d at 568.
200. Id at 563.
201. Id at 568.
202. Id
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tional and emotional difficulties the Hernandez children would suffer
if their parents were deported and they accompanied them.203
The Fifth Circuit, en banc, reversed the panel decision and found
that the BIA had not abused its discretion when it decided the chil-
dren would not suffer extreme hardship.2 °4 The court defined "ex-
treme hardship" as hardship which is "uniquely extreme, at or closely
approaching the outer limits of the most severe hardship the alien
could suffer and so severe that any reasonable person would necessar-
ily conclude that the hardship is extreme. 20 -5 This interpretation, as
the dissent points out, "strips the phrase 'extreme hardship' of virtu-
ally all content and abdicates our responsibility under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act to assure against arbitrary and capricious
administrative action.
'20 6
On appeal, the respondents did not raise any constitutional is-
sues, but argued that the court used an extremely narrow definition of
extreme hardship and that the BIA had failed to analyze the hardship
factors both individually and cumulatively. The latter argument, re-
jected by the en banc opinion, had been successfully employed in
other cases to overturn the BIA's exercise of broad discretion.20 7 The
result in Hernandez-Cordero confirms the prediction made in a 1983
Harvard Law Review Note:
[B]ecause Jong Ha Wang seems to preclude the courts from en-
forcing their own substantive notions about the appropriateness
of granting discretionary relief from deportation, the courts may
be unable to affect anything more than the language in which
the Board couches its conclusions. Thus, effective judicial con-
203. Id. The dissenting opinion written by Circuit Judge Alvin B. Rubin and joined by
four other judges describes the affidavits in depth and concluded that the hearing officer
"considered all families to be fungible and, therefore, apparently attached no weight to
[these] affidavits." Id. Judge Rubin goes on to state:
Testimony from employers, creditors, and teachers confirms that the Her-
nandezes are an exemplary family who have worked long and hard to establish a
life for themselves in the United States and who would suffer devastating conse-
quences if deported to Mexico. Although a recitation of evidence from the rec-
ord is sometimes redundant, in this instance it is the only way adequately to
portray the family.
Id.
204. Id. at 564.
205. Id. at 563.
206. Id. at 564 (Robin, J., dissenting). See also infra part II.A.2. and accompanying
text.
207. Hernandez-Cordero, 819 F.2d at 561.
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trol of agency discretion to deny relief from deportation may be
a short-lived phenomenon. °8
The Cerrillos failed to argue the effect that their deportation
would have on their children's constitutional fights if they chose to
leave their children behind. This was discussed by the Ninth Circuit in
Cerrillo-Perez v. INS.2"9 In Cerrillo-Perez, the respondents had nine
children. The three youngest children, aged nine, eight, and four,
were United States citizens.210 They were, like the Hernandezes,
hard-working people who were employed and owned their own
home.21" ' The BIA denied their application for suspension of deporta-
tion on the premise that the three United States citizen children would
accompany their parents to Mexico and that this would not result in
extreme hardship to the children.212
The Hernandezes argued that the BIA failed to consider a rele-
vant factor - the hardship to their United States citizen children if
they were to remain in the United States following the parents' depor-
tation.213 The court, in contrast, considered such separation a distinct
possibility:
We need not consider the validity of the BIA's findings regard-
ing the children's ability to adjust to life in Mexico because the
Board failed entirely to consider the alternative possibility that
the citizen children would stay in this country.
Citizen children have, of course, an absolute right to remain
in the United States. The Cerrillos' citizen children were born
to Mexican nationals here illegally. They are obviously too
young to decide for themselves whether to live in Mexico or the
United States following their parents' deportation. Accordingly,
their parents would be forced to make the decision for them.
The Cerrillos are faced with a difficult choice. Either they can
keep their family together and bring all of their children with
them to Mexico or they can break up their family and arrange
for three of their children to remain [in the United States].
Faced with similar dilemmas, parents have often made the pain-
ful choice of dividing their family in order to provide [their chil-
dren] with an opportunity for a better life. In some of these
instances, parents have fled their homeland to escape persecu-
tion and left their children with friends or relatives; in others the
parents have remained and sent their children to a safe haven.
208. Note, Developments in the Law - Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96
HARV. L. REv. 1286, 1398 (1983).
209. 809 F.2d 1419, 1422-27 (9th Cir. 1987).
210. Id. at 1421.
211. Id.
212. It at 1423.
213. Id.
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That young American citizens may be separated from their
parents - and concomitantly, that alien parents may be sepa-
rated from their children - are relevant factors to be consid-
ered when determining extreme hardship.2
14
In Cerrillo-Perez, the court stated: "Our decisions establish that
the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because it
is deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition. '215 This lan-
guage acknowledges the central role of family relationships in our so-
ciety and the need to protect those relationships through the legal
system.21 6 Our country's preoccupation with family reunification is
demonstrated by Congress' recent enactment of provisions to ensure
family fairness in the 1990 Amendment to counteract hardship situa-
tions created by IRCA.217
Nayak v. Vance218 is another example of the disastrous effect of
the failure to argue the constitutional rights of citizen children. Dr.
Nayak came to the United States as a visiting physician from India.219
While in the United States, Dr. Nayak and his wife had a child. 0 The
specified term of Dr. Nayak's visit expired."2 Exchange visitors, such
as Dr. Nayak, are required to return to their native land for two years,
or to work or reside in another foreign country before they are eligi-
ble to apply for permanent residency in the United States.' This
two-year foreign residency requirement, however, can be waived by
law.22 The Nayak's child allegedly suffered from a rare skin disease
214. Id- at 1423-24.
215. Id. at 1423 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
216. Moreover, the preservation of family unity is recognized as a critical factor in ad-
mitting refugees to a country. See UNrrED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES,
HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRrrEmA FOR DETEa-uiNoG REFUGEE STATus 43-44
(1979). Equally important, it is universally recognized that "the family is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the state."
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/S10, at 71 (1948).
Additionally, "[t]he legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act clearly indi-
cates that the Congress intended to provide for a liberal treatment of children and was
concerned with the problem of keeping families of United States citizens and immigrants
united." H.R. REP. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1957). It is against this background
that the BIA must examine the eligibility of an alien to remain in this country when his or
her deportation might result in the break up of a family or otherwise cause hardship to a
"spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen.., or... permanent residen[t]" of the United
States. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994).
217. The Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 301, 104 Stat. 5029 (1990).
218. 463 F. Supp. 244 (D.S.C. 1978).
219. Id. at 245. See supra note 7.
220. Nayak, 463 F. Supp. at 245.
221. Id.
222. Id-
223. Id See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (1994).
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that could only be treated in the United States. 2 4 Dr. Nayak, acting
as plaintiff pro se, feared that if he were forced to leave the child here,
the child would be neglected or put up for adoption to strangers. 25
Constitutional issues should have been raised in this case. The
family could either be torn apart so that the child would receive the
medical care needed, or the child could remain with his family and
endure needless pain and suffering from the rare skin disease. The
court closely followed the opinion of the Third Circuit in Acosta,226
stating that the child could always return to the United States. 227 No
hearing was ever conducted to determine the rights of the Nayaks'
citizen child.
Another child in need of medical care available only in the
United States, suffered the same fate in Gallanosa v. United States.
2 8
Mr. Gallanosa entered the United States from the Philippines on a
visa to obtain medical training.2 9 He was accompanied by his wife
and one child.230 Three children were later born in the United
States.'2 1 The Gallanosas obtained several extensions, but finally the
INS instituted deportation proceedings.232 At their deportation hear-
ing, they were granted voluntary departure 3 3 The Gallanosas, how-
ever, did not leave voluntarily and failed to file an application for
suspension of deportation.'23 They subsequently filed three motions
to reopen their deportation to apply for suspension of deportation.235
The Gallanosas claimed their citizen child needed medical care
that was only available in the United States."2 6 Deportation of the
Gallanosas would result in a de facto deportation of their child, there-
fore, denying their child her constitutional rights as an American citi-
zen.2 7 The court rejected their claim, finding that the assertion that
224. Nayak, 463 F. Supp. at 250.
225. Idt at 246.
226. Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1977). See infra notes ????-278 and ac-
companying text.
227. Nayak, 463 F. Supp. at 247.
228. 785 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1986).




233. Id. Voluntary departure allows an alien to leave the United States without the
stigma and penalties of deportation. THOMAS A. ALm OFF & DAVm A. MARTN, IMMW-
GRATION POLICY AND PRocEss 598 (2d ed. 1991).
234. Gallanosa, 785 F. 2d at 117.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 120.
237. Id.
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medical care was only available in the United States was not a sub-
stantial constitutional claim. 8 The court also concluded that the de-
portation of the parents did not violate any constitutional fights of the
citizen children.239 The court was quick to point out, however, that
"[t]he basis for the Gallanosas' constitutional claim [was] not clearly
put."'14 Given existing decisions regarding the fight of children to the
companionship and care of their parents, the holding in the Gallanosa
case is misguided. Considering the important fights at stake, more
than a cursory dismissal of the child's interests in the deportation of
his or her parents is warranted.
In Martinez de Mendoza v. INS. 1, the mother of a citizen child
asserted that returning to Colombia would put her and her child in
mortal danger- 42 Mrs. Mendoza's husband had severely abused her
several times. 43 He returned to Colombia after serving a sentence for
shooting two men who had tried to prevent him from attacking his
wife and daughter? 4 The court found that Mrs. Mendoza's claim that
she and her daughter would be placed in grave danger was sufficient
to remand the case to the INS for further investigation regarding
whether deportation would cause "extreme hardship."'245 More im-
portantly, the court added in a footnote that "if the allegations that de
facto deportation of Yolanda Carmen Mendoza [petitioner's citizen
child] would expose her to physical danger [were] correct, they may
well be sufficient to raise questions of the constitutionality of such de-
portation not answered by our decision in Acosta.'' 4 6 Equally impor-
tant is the court's acknowledgement of the holding in Acosta that a
citizen child of an alien subject to deportation has standing as a "per-
son aggrieved" by the deportation order within the meaning of the
Administrative Procedure Act.247 If a court can find that a child has




241. 567 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1977).
242. Id. at 1223.
243. Id. at 1224.
244. Id.
245. I& at 1226. The court does not use the term "extreme hardship" because the peti-
tioner did not request suspension of deportation. In this case, petitioner filed a motion to
stay deportation. Id. at 1224. However, in footnote eight of the opinion, the court indi-
cates that Mrs. Martinez de Mendoza had been present in the United States for all but one
month since June 1970, and thus may be eligible for suspension of deportation. Id. at 1225
n.8.
246. Id
247. Id. at 1223 n.1. See also 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-706 (1992).
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that the child's interests are affected. The only shortcoming of the de
Mendoza decision is that it did not conclude that a hearing to deter-
mine the child's rights should be guaranteed under the
Constitution.24
Where there is no parens patrie justification, the child's interests
are viewed separately from those of the state. Government action in
deportation cases should, therefore, be seen as adversarial to the
child's interest, as in the witness protection context. The current prac-
tice in deportation suspension cases, however, treats the citizen child
as a mere bystander. The "extreme hardship" inquiry does not pro-
vide sufficient procedural protections to the fundamental rights of the
child. The child's constitutional interests are so obscured by this stan-
dard that they are barely recognizable. Nevertheless, the fundamental
right of a child to parental companionship does exist and should not
be disregarded by the Attorney General.
As indicated earlier, the court in Franz noted that "[h]olding the
hearing before execution of the decision is particularly important
where, as here, the deprivation of the protected interest might be ir-
revocable or might cause irreparable harm."'" 9 When a child's parent
faces deportation, his or her constitutional interests are clearly at
stake. It is impractical to consider the rights of the child after the par-
ent has been deported. To deny a citizen child the right to challenge
government action in an adversarial forum is a gross violation of the
principles of due process. The state should be required to satisfy the
child's due process rights by providing a separate hearing for the child.
The INS, as a governmental agency, should not be exempt from the
demands of the Due Process Clause.
D. Citizen Children and Procedural Due Process Rights
In the Michael H. decision, Justice Scalia reasoned that because
the father could not assert any substantive parental right, there was no
need to examine whether he was entitled to procedural due process.250
As one scholar has put it: "Even if the Court is willing to stretch his-
tory and establish a biological father's due process right to a paternity
hearing, why bother if the biological father of a bastard child has no
substantive parental rights to claim once paternity is established?"' 51
Scalia's "history and tradition" analysis of fundamental rights sup-
248. Martinez de Mendoza, 567 F.2d at 1226.
249. Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
250. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 126-27 (1989).
251. Young, supra note 14, at 591.
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ports the right of a child to the care and nurturing of his parents.252
Thus, it could be argued that after a finding that such a right exists, the
child must be afforded the procedural right to a hearing when he faces
separation from his family?5 3
In Franz, the District of Columbia Circuit stated that "the af-
fected parties must be accorded the procedural protections mandated
by the Due Process Clauses."' 54 The court noted that it is beyond
dispute that the termination of the parent-child relationship must
meet the requirements of due process. 255 While the procedural due
process rights of the illegal immigrant parent may be satisfied by the
suspension of deportation hearing, the citizen child is not granted the
same protection.
The court in Ramos v. INS,256 stated that "[e]ven where all re-
quirements [for discretionary suspension of deportation] are met, sus-
pension of deportation may be denied in the exercise of discretion." 7
Thus, while the Attorney General is required to consider relevant
hardship factors, the "decision whether to suspend deportation of an
alien who satisfies the... statutory requirements [for such suspension]
is therefore discretionary, and is subject only to a most restricted judi-
cial review. '258 The fundamental right of the citizen child to parental
companionship should not be circumvented by incorporating a mere
cursory examination of the effect upon the child into the determina-
tion of the alien parent's rights. By failing to subject state action to
strict scrutiny within the context of the child's rights, the Attorney
General deprives citizen children of constitutionally protected rights
without the benefit of due process.
The three functions served by the principle of procedural due
process recognized by the Franz court are equally valid within the
context of suspension of deportation.
First, by exposing to adversarial testing the government's as-
serted rationale for its action, it reduces the likelihood of error
- i.e., the risk that the government will act on the basis of what,
in reality, is an insufficient justification. Second, it permits the
adversely affected parties to inform the government of ways in
which the government's objectives might be achieved through
means less restrictive of their rights. Third, it accords the af-
252. Id. at 590-91.
253. Id. at 591-92.
254. Franz, 707 F.2d at 602.
255. I& at 607.
256. 695 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1983).
257. Id. at 184.
258. Id. at 184-85.
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fected parties some measure of dignity; it enables them to par-
ticipate in and understand the process whereby their interests
are assessed and, if necessary, restricted.5 9
Furthermore, the three factors identified by the court in Franz
are roughly equivalent to the three factors the Court in Mathews v.
Eldridge 60 examined to determine what type of process was due.261
Under Mathews, the type of procedural protections due depends upon
the evaluation of the private interests at stake, the government's inter-
est, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to an erroneous
decision.262 Clearly, the interests at stake of the citizens' child are
enormous: the right to live as a citizen in his country of birth with the
companionship of his parents. The government's interest in protect-
ing our borders and ensuring compliance with immigration laws is sig-
nificant. Nevertheless, the risk that the child will be erroneously
deprived of rights by a procedure that does not contemplate a hearing
to determine the best interest of the child, and the Attorney General's
unfettered discretion violates the Mathews standard because the child
is deprived of basic constitutional protection.
The 1986 congressional amendment of the INA provisions gov-
erning immigration based on marriage provides a good illustration of
a deprivation of procedural due process rights of a United States citi-
zen. The amendments were enacted to deter and detect fraudulent
marriages more effectively.263 Perhaps the most controversial aspect
of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments Act ("IMFA") is
section 5, which added two new provisions to the INA.264 Both provi-
259. Franz, 707 F.2d at 608 (footnotes omitted).
260. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
261. Id. at 334-35.
262. Id.
263. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537
(1986).
264. The first provision is 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e):
(e)(1) [A]n alien who is seeking to receive an immigrant visa on the basis of a
marriage which was entered into during the period described in paragraph (2)
may not have the alien's status adjusted under subsection (a) of this section.
(2) The period described in this paragraph is the period during which administra-
tive or judicial proceedings are pending regarding the alien's right to enter or
remain in the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1255(e) (Supp. V 1993).
The other new provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(h) reads:
(h) [A visa] petition may not be approved to grant an alien immediate relative
status or preference status by reason of a marriage which was entered into during
the period described in section 1255(e)(2), of this title, until the alien has resided
outside the United States for a two year period beginning after the date of the
marriage.
8 U.S.C. § 1154(h) (Supp. V 1993).
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sions establish irrebuttable presumptions that an alien who marries
either a United States citizen or a lawful permanent resident while in
exclusion or in deportation hearings has entered into a fraudulent
marriage in order to obtain immigration benefits.265 Several lawsuits
challenged the constitutionality of these sections. 266 The constitu-
tional arguments presented on behalf of the rights of a citizen spouse
in these cases parallel those discussed in this paper with respect to a
citizen child: the fundamental right to marry and live with your family,
as guaranteed by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.267
Most courts have upheld the constitutionality of these sections of
the IMFA under Congress' plenary power over immigration.26 The
similarity of the predicament facing the citizen spouse and the citizen
child is clear: an American citizen should not be placed in the situa-
tion of having to choose between his or her country and his or her
family.
In 1990, before the Supreme Court had the opportunity to ad-
dress the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(e), Congress amended
the section by providing a hearing to permit affected aliens to avoid
the two-year foreign residency requirement if they proved by clear
and convincing evidence that their marriage was genuine.269
265. Id
266. These sections created an irrebuttable presumption that the marriage was a sham
marriage and could not confer immigration benefits. Thus, there was no provision for a
hearing that would allow the parties to show that they had entered into a bona fide mar-
riage. See Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1990); Anetekhai v. INS, 876 F.2d
1218 (5th Cir. 1989); Almario v. Attorney General, 872 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1989).
267. Azizi, 908 F.2d at 1133-35 (rejecting due process and equal protection challenges);
Anetekai, 876 F.2d at 1221-23 (rejecting due process, equal protection, and Ninth and
Tenth Amendment violations); Almarlo, 872 F.2d at 151-52 (rejecting due process and
equal protection violations).
268. See supra note 266.
269. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(g) states:
RESTRICTION ON PETITIONS BASED ON MARRIAGES ENTERED WHILE IN EXCLU-
SION OR DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS.
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, except as provided in section
1255(e)(3) of this title, a petition may not be approved to grant an alien immedi-
ate relative status or preference status by reason of a marriage which was entered
into during the period described in section 1255(e)(2) of this title, until the alien
has resided outside the United States for a 2-year period beginning after the date
of the marriage.
8 U.S.C. § 1154(g) (Supp. V 1993).
Furthermore, section 1255(e) states:
RESTRICTIONS ON ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS BASED ON MARRIAGES ENTERED
WHILE IN EXCLUSION OR DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS; BONA FIDE MARRIAGE
EXCEPTION.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (3), an alien who is seeking to receive
an immigrant visa on the basis of a marriage which was entered into during the
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Although the burden of proof is demanding, Congress at least ac-
knowledged that the procedural due process rights of a United States
citizen were violated by the irrebuttable presumption of a fraudulent
marriage.
E. De Facto Deportation And The Prospect of Returning to The
United States
Although the judiciary is quite active in protecting the child in
areas of law,270 the courts have nonetheless deferred to the Attorney
General's decisions in immigration cases. The argument that a citizen
child is subject to de facto deportation when his or her parents are
deported has not been fully addressed by the Supreme Court due to
the Court's position that immigration is an area traditionally left to
Congress.271 The de facto deportation argument stresses the child's
lack of choice when the parents are forced to leave the country. De-
portation either deprives the citizen child of the right to be brought up
in this country with the accompanying educational and economic ben-
efits available to every other citizen child, or it deprives the citizen
child of the right to a family life with his or her natural parents. The
Third Circuit's opinion in Acosta272 is the prevailing opinion of most
period described in paragraph (2) may not have the alien's status adjusted under
subsection (a) of this section.
(2) The period described in this paragraph is the period during which admin-
istrative or judicial proceedings are pending regarding the alien's right to enter or
remain in the United States.
(3) Paragraph (1) and section 1154(g) of this title shall not apply with re-
spect to a marriage if the alien establishes by clear and convincing evidence to the
satisfaction of the Attorney General that the marriage was entered into in good
faith and in accordance with the laws of the place where the marriage took place
and the marriage was not entered into for the purpose of procuring the alien's
entry as an immigrant and no fee or other consideration was given (other than a
fee or other consideration to an attorney for assistance in preparation of a lawful
petition) for the filing of a petition under section 1154(a) of this title or section
1184(d) with respect to the alien spouse or alien son or daughter. In accordance
with regulations, there shall be only one level of administrative appellate review
for each alien under the previous sentence.
8 U.S.C. § 1154(e) (Supp. V 1993).
270. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (finding that a state's procedure for admitting
a child for treatment to a state mental hospital must be consistent with constitutional guar-
antees); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that minors in delinquency proceed-
ings must have charges proved beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
(holding that minors charged with delinquency were entitled to due process).
271. See supra note 3.
272. Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153, 1157-58 (3d Cir. 1977).
Courts have upheld the constitutionality of the deportation of aliens with United
States citizen children, inter alia, under the rationale that deportation of the parents has
only an incidental impact upon the rights of the child.
As stated by the court in in re Amoury, 307 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1969):
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courts: because the child is of "tender" years, he or she would un-
doubtedly choose to reside wherever her parents live.273 When the
child reaches the age of discretion, he or she will be able to decide
where to live.274
In Acosta, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with the
de facto deportation of a young girl along with her Colombian na-
tional parents. 275 The child claimed that she would be deprived of her
constitutional right to live in the United States. The court replied:
The right of an American citizen to fix and change his residence
is a continuing one which he enjoys throughout his life. Thus
while today Lina Acosta, as an infant twenty-two months of age,
doubtless desires merely to be where she can enjoy the care and
affection of her parents, whether in the United States or Colum-
bia, she will as she grows older and reaches years of discretion
be entitled to decide for herself where she wants to live and ...
return to the United States to live.
276
Although this logic is superficially persuasive, it simply is not the
constitutional standard in cases involving fundamental rights. The
Supreme Court has never held that a law must directly affect, or com-
pletely deprive, the exercise of a fundamental right in order to be held
The order of deportation is not directed toward [the citizen child] and obviously
no action is contemplated under its terms with respect to him. It is all too true
that ofttimes individuals, entirely innocent of wrongful conduct, suffer equally
with those who commit the wrongful act which brings penalties in its wake. But
this does not mean that a constitutional violation has been visited upon the inno-
cent person.
Id. at 216.
Similarly, in Bueno-Carrillo v. Landon, 682 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1982), the court agreed
with the BIA that "while petitioner's return to Mexico may mean that the child will also
leave the United States, there is nothing in the law requiring the child's departure, and
nothing to prevent her return." Id. at 146. Additionally, in Lopez v. Franklin, 427 F. Supp.
345 (E.D. Mich. 1977), the court reasoned:
This Court would agree that if an act of the government did result in the "outright
destruction" of an essential privilege of citizenship, that act would indeed by "re-
pugnant to the Constitution" .... However this Court does not agree that the
decision of the parents, (who are the only subjects of the deportation order) to
take their infant child back with them to their native land, results in the "outright
destruction" of any privileges of United States citizenship that child has. The
child does not lose his citizenship status upon his departure from this country. He
is perfectly free to return to the United States whenever he has the desire and the
means (either independently or through others) to do so.
Id. at 348-349 (emphasis added). Building on this reasoning, the court in Acosta asserted
that the parents' deportation "will merely postpone, but not bar," the child's ultimate resi-
dence in the United States. Acosta, 558 F.2d at 1158.
273. Acosta, 558 F.2d at 1158.
274. Id.
275. Id., 558 F.2d at 1155.
276. Id. at 1158.
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unconstitutional. To the contrary, the test for invoking strict scrutiny
is whether the law in question substantially impinges upon or burdens
the exercise of a fundamental right.277 Thus, the court's reasoning
makes very little sense. Indeed, the court comes perilously close to
holding that children enjoy no fundamental constitutional rights; a
proposition that the Supreme Court has consistently rejected.2 78
The Acosta court appears to have confused two separate rights.
While American citizens enjoy the right to decide where to ive,279
they may not be compelled to leave the country.2 °0 The latter right is
at stake in deportation cases. To hold that a child enjoys no right be-
cause he or she is incapable of exercising it makes little sense. Fur-
thermore, the court interprets the deprivation of up to eighteen, or
more, years of the child's life as "merely a postponement," not a bar
upon the child's residence in the United States. 81 A child who leaves
this country due to deportation action against his or her parents suf-
fers from more than a trivial delay in the enjoyment of the benefits
and opportunities that attend United States citizenship. Rather, the
de facto deportation of these children potentially acts as a bar to any
future return to the United States when viewed from educational, eco-
nomic, social, and cultural perspectives. Thus, even if Lina Acosta
does ultimately elect to return to the United States once she reaches
the age of majority, she may be unable to avail herself of any constitu-
tional protections as a practical matter.
277. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
278. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 581 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
279. This right derives from the right to travel and migrate. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969).
280. This right is based directly on the concept of citizenship. United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 676, 682, 688 (1898). According to Aleinikoff and Martin:
Some of the language of the majority opinion seemed to leave open the status of
children born within the United States to alien parents only temporarily present
within the national borders. But in fact the Wong Kim Ark decision has served to
establish for the United States a "general rule of universal citizenship" by birth, in
the words of a leading immigration treatise, G & M § 12.5. Birth in the territorial
United States, even to parents fresh across the border after an illegal entry, re-
sults in U.S. citizenship. The only exceptions to this jus soli rule are exceedingly
narrow: birth to foreign sovereigns and accredited diplomatic officials; birth on
foreign public vessels-meaning essentially warships, not commercial vessels-
even while they are located in U.S. territorial waters (we wonder: does this ever
happen?); birth to alien enemies in hostile occupation of a portion of U.S.
territory.
ALMNIKOFF & MsrnN, supra note 151, at 976.
281. Acosta, 558 F.2d at 1158.
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While the Acosta court dismissed as much as eighteen years of a
individual's life as having "no effect" upon the individual, 28 the
United States Supreme Court has recognized the developmental im-
portance of childhood years as crucial to the future success of the indi-
vidual as a functioning member of United States society. 8 3 Justice
Brennan stated in Plyler, "[t]oday, education is perhaps the most im-
portant function of state and local governments.... Today it is a prin-
cipal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust nor-
mally to his environment."'  In a concurring opinion, Justice Black-
mun noted that "[c]hildren who are denied an education are placed at
a permanent and insurmountable competitive disadvantage, for an un-
educated child is denied even the opportunity to achieve." 285  Even
the dissent, authored by Chief Justice Burger, agreed that an enlight-
ened society should not deny any child, regardless of his illegal status,
the right to a basic education. 6 Yet, the Acosta court failed to recog-
nize the potential hazards of deprivation of education, labelling the
extended separation from the United States as a "mere postpone-
ment" of the enjoyment of this right.
A young child who leaves this country before reaching school age
will undoubtedly be at a severe disadvantage if he or she chooses to
return and attempt to function as an adult member of our society. For
example, where will this citizen find employment? Can we realisti-
cally expect him or her to possess basic skills which other, minimally
educated United States residents acquire during their elementary
school education? Such an individual may not even possess basic
skills necessary to seek employment, such as filling out applications
and answering questions posed by interviewers. A returned citizen is
at a severe disadvantage even as compared to noncitizens who are
illegally residing in this country. Members of this latter group are
granted an elementary education just as resident citizen children are
under Plyler.87
Even if a newly-returned citizen manages to break into the
American job market, a language barrier will arise assuming the citi-
zen child was not raised in an English speaking country. Although
non-English speaking individuals comprise a substantial percentage of
282. Id-
283. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
284. Id at 223 (quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
285. Id at 234 (Blackmun, J. concurring).
286. Id at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 226, 230.
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this country's work force, an individual who speaks another language
can only aspire to a narrow range of jobs. This distinguishing factor,
alone, poses a great disadvantage to the returned citizen.
A deported child is unlikely to receive an elementary education
comparable to that which we guarantee to children residing in this
country, especially if the child's family is impoverished. Many other
countries assess the cost of schooling directly on the family, thus af-
fording a formal education only to wealthier members of society.
In Jong Ha Wang, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized
the hardship imposed on a child due to a language barrier.38 The
court reviewed a deportation order for two Korean nationals whose
two school age children were citizens of the United States.2 9 The
opinion overturned a prior decision by the BIA, which failed to con-
sider the parent's claim of educational hardship. -9 The Ninth Circuit
Court stated that "both children have spent their entire lives in this
country; they do not speak Korean. Under these circumstances we do
not believe that the Board should summarily have dismissed the
Wangs' claim of hardship to their children. ' 291 Thus, the court recog-
nized that language plays a significant role in determining a child's
plight upon entering a foreign country.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also considered language
proficiency to be a requisite element of the BIA's rehearing process.
In Ramirez-Durazo v. INS,292 the court upheld a BIA decision which
considered whether fluency in Spanish could be a mitigatory element
in favor of deporting children of noncitizen parents to a Spanish-
speaking country.2 93 In Jara-Navarrete v. INS,2 94 the court found that
the BIA abused its discretion by failing to consider factors such as
language and psychological effects on a child, when it cursorily upheld
the deportation order and concluded that the three children were
"still very young and . . . should be able to adapt successfully to
Mexico.
,2 95
According to Plyler, all children living in this country, regardless
of their citizenship, have the right to obtain a basic education and
288. Jong Ha Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341, 1348 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd per curiam, 450
U.S. 139 (1981).
289. Id. at 1344.
290. AL at 1349.
291. Id. at 1348.
292. 794 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1986).
293. Id.
294. 813 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1986).
295. Id at 1342.
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learn English.296 That courts are concerned with a child's language-
assimilation upon deportation of his or her parents indicates that this
factor may ultimately convince a court to allow a family to remain in
this country. Accordingly, language and education should be substan-
tial considerations if a court expects displaced citizen children to even-
tually choose to return to this country. If we consider the deportation
of citizen children to be a "mere postponement" of residence in the
United States, we must acknowledge that education alone will be a
major deterrent to their return.
The Ninth Circuit has recognized a child's right to remain with his
or her family and has attempted to preserve that right by considering
separation alone to constitute extreme hardship.2 97  After the
Supreme Court's decision in Jong Ha Wang, however, most courts
simply assume that a child would choose to leave the country to re-
main with his or her family.298 Other courts, however, have held that
the BIA cannot assume that citizen children will accompany their par-
ents upon deportation.299 The rights at stake for the child are basic,
and deserve more than perfunctory treatment.
As shown earlier, even the dissent in Plyler agreed without hesi-
tation that an "enlightened society" should not deprive even illegal
aliens of an education. °° Chief Justice Burger wrote, "it would be
folly-and wrong-to tolerate creation of a segment of society made
up of illiterate persons, many having a limited or no command of our
language."
3 01
Plyler applies to undocumented alien children. Thus, one can log-
ically infer that education holds an esteemed role in the life of the
citizen child as well. Yet, when that citizen child faces de facto depor-
tation, our courts have down played that education today is "perhaps
[the] most important function of state and local governments. 30 2
One could argue that a court is only concerned with the education of
children who are going to remain and live in the United States. This
reasoning, however, is extremely short-sighted if a court also assumes,
as in Acosta, that a child may choose to return and live in the United
States once he or she obtains majority. When that child returns, Ply-
296. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982).
297. Cerrillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1419, 1427 (9th Cir. 1987).
298. Id. at 1423 ("[T]he Board failed entirely to consider the alternative possibility that
the citizen children would stay in this country.")
299. Id
300. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 242 (Burger, J., dissenting).
301. Id
302. Id. at 222 (quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
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ler's observations regarding the urgent need for an education in order
to succeed in the United States are applicable.
F. Jong Ha Wang and Plyler. Can They be Reconciled?
The Supreme Court, in Plyler, admitted that without education,
children who are already disadvantaged by racial prejudices and by an
inability to speak English "will become permanently locked into the
lowest socio-economic class."'303 A year earlier, however, the Court
refused to even consider an alleged deprivation of the right to educa-
tion for citizen children in Jong Ha Wang.3° The Court chose to up-
hold the discretion conferred on the INS by Congress, rather than
address any deprivation of rights claims. 305 The Court's only refer-
ence to education was the statement that the BIA was acting within its
authority when it refused to believe that the two young Korean chil-
dren, with affluent and educated parents, would be subject to educa-
tional deprivation amounting to extreme hardship. 0 6 The Jong Ha
Wang opinion reasoned that any attempt by the judiciary to broaden
or modify the definition of "extreme hardship" would constitute an
improper encroachment on the authority that the INA granted the
Attorney General.307 Furthermore, a reviewing court should not in-
validate an interpretation by the Attorney General because it prefers
a different interpretation.08
If a child is forced to depart with his or her parents, what is the
probability that a non-English speaking child will be able to "main-
stream" and succeed in the socio-economic system of the United
States upon return? The Court's failure to address this issue in the
deportation context is disheartening. By the time the child has
reached the age of majority, it may be too late to take advantage of
opportunities this country offers. The "choice" which the citizen child
would hypothetically make regarding whether to return to the United
States would become illusory - any inability to comprehend English
or to participate in our social system may deter a later return to this
country. Furthermore, if the adult child were to return to the United
States, our government would incur a great economic burden of sup-
porting a culturally disadvantaged citizen.
303. IdL at 208.
304. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145 (1981).
305. It
306. 1& at 143, 145.
307. Id. at 144.
308. 1
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IV. Equal Protection and the Right of Children to Parental
Companionship
As discussed above, there is no significant difference between a
child who is separated from a parent enrolled in a witness protection
program and one who is separated from a deported parent. The chil-
dren's interests are identical; the programs are both under the direc-
tion of the Attorney General, and the children's lives are affected by
parental actions over which they had no control. The court in Franz
noted in its discussion of substantive due process that the same result
might be reached through an equal protection analysis:
We observe that the Witness Protection Program, as imple-
mented, results in the denial of access by a particular group ...
to a fundamental right (the right to the companionship of one's
child or parent). Accordingly, the Program should be subjected
to "strict scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause. In other
words, the government must show that discrimination between
members of the affected group and other parents and children is
necessary to promote a "compelling governmental interest."309
Deportation of a parent denies citizen children the same funda-
mental right to parental companionship that the court found the Wit-
ness Protection Program denied children in Franz. There is no reason
why the Attorney General should not be required to meet a strict
scrutiny standard within the context of deportation.
To deny citizen children of illegal immigrant parents a fundamen-
tal right is the kind of invidious discrimination against which the
Equal Protection Clause protects.
310
The interests of a child under the equal protection clause de-
serve no less weight than those of an adult .... This concept has
led the Court to identify three properties a trait may possess
that militate in favor of rigorous scrutiny: immutability, stigma,
and general irrelevance to ability or merit.3 '
Children of illegal immigrants do not choose their parents, yet their
rights as citizens are given no attention because of their parentage.
In most equal protection cases, a reviewing court applies the "ra-
tional basis" test to the legislation in question 312 Under this highly
309. Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 603 n.89 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
310. While the Equal Protection Clause is directed at the States, the Supreme Court has
recognized that "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of [the Due Pro-
cess Clause]." Boiling v. Sharpe, 397 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
311. Note, Developments In The Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L.
Rnv. 1157, 1364-65 (1980).
312. Id. at 1188.
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deferential test,313 the law will be upheld if it bears some reasonable
relation to a legitimate state interest. That is, the law will pass consti-
tutional muster as long as it can reasonably be deemed to further a
state interest. Moreover, the state interest need not be expressly ar-
ticulated in the law.314 A legitimate post hoc justification is sufficient.
The Supreme Court, however, has noted that such a deferential stan-
dard of review will often not fulfill the intent of the Equal Protection
Clause.315 Accordingly, when a law creates a "suspect class" the law is
subject to strict scrutiny.316 Under this test, to survive constitutional
challenge, the law must be "precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest. ' 317 Because laws that undergo strict scrutiny
review are typically deemed unconstitutional, this stringent level of
review has been described as "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact.
'318 If
less burdensome means are available to achieve the same objective,
the law will be deemed unconstitutional.31 9 The application of strict
scrutiny in an equal protection claim is triggered by classifications
based on a suspect class or those affecting a fundamental right.
Otherwise, courts typically apply the rational basis test.320
The concept of a suspect class may be traced to the famous foot-
note in United States v. Carolene Products Co.321 In this case, the
Court hinted that a law which "prejudice[s] against discrete and insu-
lar minorities may be a special condition... which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." '322 In Graham v.
313. Professor Gerald Gunther described the rational basis test as providing for "mini-
mal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact." Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court
1971 Term - Foreword In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing CourL A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 IARv. L. RBv. 1, 8 (1972).
314. Id. See also New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 305 (1976).
315. JoHN E. NOVACK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 574-75 (4th
ed. 1991).
316. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
317. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982). Some cases have stated that the law
must be "necessary" to achieve a compelling governmental interest. See Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
318. Gunther, supra note 313, at 8.
319. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
320. The courts apply intermediate scrutiny when a quasi-suspect class is created by a
law. See supra notes 71-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of intermediate scrutiny
and quasi-susflect classifications. In addition, a law need not always facially create a sus-
pect class in otder for heightened review to be applied. If it is shown that the legislation
was motivated by a discriminatory purpose, strict scrutiny will apply if the law has an un-
due impact on a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,240-
42 (1976).
321. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
322. Id. at 153 n.4.
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Richardson323 the Court adopted this logic as the test for defining a
suspect class.3 24 Finally, in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez32 the Court clarified the principle of a suspect class:
groups that have been "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness" are entitled to special judicial pro-
tection.326 According to this principle, therefore, classifications based
on race, national origin and alienage are inherently suspect. 2 7
The Supreme Court has established that "distinctions on the basis
of race, national origin, and alienage can survive constitutional attack
only if they serve compelling state objectives and are precisely tai-
lored to meet those objectives." 328 The fact that children, and not
adults, are being unfairly discriminated against does not affect the
analysis. For example, in Brown v. Board of Education,3 29 the Court
held that segregated schools deny black children equal protection by
the law.
330
[T]he courts have not made the treatment of classifications that
rely on any of these suspect or semi-suspect traits depend on
whether the traits were used to distinguish between classes of
children or between classes of adults. The Court has invalidated
state actions which were discriminatory to children in several
different settings. Children cannot be denied equal treatment
under the law on the basis of their race, alienage, gender, or
parentage.331
323. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
324. Id. at 372.
325. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
326. Id. at 28.
327. Note, supra note 311, at 1365.
328. Id.
329. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
330. Id. at 495.
331. See Note, supra note 311, at 1365. Accord Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977);
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). Plyler considers children of aliens unlawfully in the
country as a quasi-suspect class. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1982). While noting
that undocumented status is "the product of their (aliens) own unlawful conduct," the
Court declared that this logic does "not apply with the same force to classifications impos-
ing disabilities on the minor children of such illegal entrants." Id. Although the parents
could leave Texas, the Court held that "the children who are the plaintiffs in these cases
'can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status." Id. at 220 (quoting Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)). Thus, finding a quasi-suspect classification due to a
combination of the children's unaccountability for their illegal status and the importance of
education, the Court ruled the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 230. "Even if the State
found it expedient to control the conduct of adults by acting against their children, legisla-
tion directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against his children does not comport with
fundamental conceptions of justice." Id. at 220. See also supra notes 60-67 and accompa-
nying text.
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The argument that children of illegal immigrants are afforded
equal protection because they have the choice to accompany the de-
ported parent is unpersuasive. The Supreme Court in Shapiro v.
Thompson,3 2 and later in Zobel v. Williams,33 held that penalizing a
citizen for exercising a fundamental right is a clear violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. a Shapiro involved a challenge to various
state statutes which required at least one year of residency before
state residents could collect welfare benefits. 35 The Court, holding
this to be a penalty on the exercise of the right to travel, applied strict
scrutiny: "Any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of
that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, is unconstitutional. '336 In Shapiro, however, the
burden on the right to travel was only incidental.337 Chief Justice
Warren dissented, arguing that travel was neither prohibited nor actu-
ally deterred.3 3 8 Also dissenting, Justice Harlan contended that the
impact on the exercise of the right to travel was "indirect" and "insub-
stantial" because the plaintiff's evidence indicated that travel was not
in fact deterred by the laws.33 9 He therefore claimed that laws which
"incidentally" cause inequalities should not be ruled unconstitu-
tional.340 Hence, to the extent that Shapiro may be taken as a rejec-
tion of these dissenting arguments, it suggests that a law's burden on
the exercise of a right does not have to be direct to be unconstitu-
tional.3 41 Therefore, the courts that upheld the deportation of aliens
with citizen children erred in basing their holdings on the incidental
effects of the deportation on the child.
If the right to travel analysis is applied to the de facto deportation
of citizen children, the conclusion remains the same, the parents' de-
portation substantially penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right.
If the child remains in the United States, he or she will be deprived of
the right to family life and the love and care of his or her parents. If
the child leaves with his or her parents, he or she will be deprived of
the right to remain and grow up in the United States. In either event,
the child will be denied the socialization process necessary to function
332. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
333. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
334. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627; Zobel, 457 U.S. at 65.
335. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 621-22.
336. Id. at 627.
337. Id. at 634.
338. Id. at 647 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
339. Id. at 676 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
340. Id.
341. Id.
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adequately as a constructive member of our society. In these situa-
tions the burden on the fundamental rights of the child is substantial
and unavoidable. To force a child to leave his or her country of citi-
zenship in order to enjoy the parental companionship to which he or
she has a right is clearly beyond the bounds of what the Supreme
Court has deemed permissible. Any other citizen child asserting this
right would be able to do so without fear of de facto deportation. The
system, for all practical purposes, forces children to choose between
exercising a fundamental right or relinquishing the benefits of United
States citizenship. It is hard to imagine a more blatant violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.
V. Capacity and Children's Right to Autonomy
Courts frequently justify de facto deportation of citizen children
by noting that the child can choose to stay in the United States or
leave and return at some future date.342 This rationale is based on a
number of assumptions. Are these courts assuming capacity for all
minors at the time of the hearing? Or, are they assuming incapacity
for all minors and delegating this critical and pivotal decision of that
child to the parents? If they assume future capacity, such an assump-
tion would be nonsensical considering that the decision to remain or
leave is made at the time of the hearing. This perfunctory treatment
of the child's interests runs counter to all decisions concerning the
legal capacity of children, and effectively precludes the child from as-
serting constitutional rights which have been recognized for the past
thirty years.
The Supreme Court has conferred considerable constitutional
rights to minors. In re Gault3 3 was the first case to extend constitu-
tional protections to children, acknowledging that "neither the Four-
teenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."3 " The
Court, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict,345 recognized school children's First Amendment rights to voice
their opposition to the Vietnam War.34 In Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth,347 the Court clearly stated that "[c]onstitutional rights do
not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the
342. E.g., Acosta v. Gaffrey, 558 F.2d 1153, 1158 (3d Cir. 1977).
343. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
344. Id. at 13.
345. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
346. Id at 513.
347. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected
by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."'
All states presume incompetence for minors under a certain age,
which varies from state to state. The Supreme Court has held that:
the States validly may limit the freedom of children to choose
for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices
with potentially serious consequences. These rulings have been
grounded in the recognition that, during the formative years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that
could be detrimental to them.A" 9
Courts have not extended to children the full spectrum of "adult"
constitutional rights because children are in a different position than
adults. In Bellotti v. Baird,35 the Court "recognized three reasons jus-
tifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot
be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children;
their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature man-
ner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing."'351
During the early development of family rights jurisprudence, the
courts did not clearly resolve the question of whether minors had indi-
vidual constitutional rights, because most of these cases involved a
clash between family autonomy and the state. 2 Later, when cases
arose from conflicts between the rights of the parents and the child,
the courts determined that the child's rights should be considered in-
dependently of the parents in certain circumstances. The most com-
mon cases were those involving the privacy rights of minors seeking
abortionsY.3 3 The Supreme Court has recognized situations in which
the minor's constitutional rights will be viewed as equivalent to the
rights of an adult. When the child's interests conflict with the parents'
or the state's, the child's interests must be viewed separately.
The Supreme Court has recognized full constitutional rights for
minors when, because of the character and importance of the
child's underlying interest., the Court will not risk relying on the
presumptions that the interests of the parents and the state are
348. Id at 74.
349. Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 at 635 (1979).
350. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
351. Id. at 634.
352. E.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604-06 (1975).
353. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 650; Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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consistent with the child's interests or that the child is too imma-
ture to make an independent, informed decision.314
When a child's interests are at stake, the court may take several
different approaches. The court can enforce parental control over the
minor and assume that the parent will choose what is in the best inter-
est of the child. 5 The court can also intervene under the doctrine of
parens patrie, after a finding that the parent is not acting, or likely to
act, in the best interest of the child.116 Thirdly, the court can deem the
minor to be a "mature minor;" that is, a minor capable of making an
informed and mature decision after consideration of the long-term
consequences of that decision.357 The "mature minor" doctrine was
first used by the courts in presuming minors capable of giving in-
formed consent to medical treatment .3 8 This doctrine has since been
extended to many different contexts, granting authority for a mature
minor's consent to various medical procedures, treatment for alcohol
abuse, use of contraceptives, and custody proceedings.359
The "mature minor" doctrine clearly recognizes the minor's
rights as separate and distinct from those of the parent:
Parents have a right to control of their children, and the state
can limit such control only upon demonstrating a compelling in-
terest. Absent such an interest, the state must enforce parental
control .... [T]he parents' right to control does not include the
right to make certain choices with "grave and indelible" conse-
quences on behalf of mature minors. Instead, a minor who can
prove her maturity has the sole right to make such decisions.
3 60
The mature minor doctrine can be implemented through a two-tier
test which first assesses the minor's maturity.361 If the minor is found
to be mature enough to understand the nature and consequences of
the decision at issue, then he or she should be free to make his or her
own decisions. This is determined on a case-by-case basis since the
ability of the minor to make competent choices varies depending upon
the subject matter of the decision.362 If the minor does not have the
capacity to make the decision, the court should make the decision in
354. Alison M. Brumley, Parental Control of a Minor's Right to Sue in Federal Court, 58
U. Cn. L. REv. 333, 339 (1991).
355. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603-04 (1979).
356. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
357. Leslie A. Fithian, Note, Forceable Repatriation of Minors: The Competing Rights of
Parent and Child, 37 ST'AN. L. REv. 187, 208 (1984).
358. 1d at 201.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 208.
361. Brumley, supra note 354, at 346, 351.
362. 1d. at 353.
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the best interests of the child.3 63 The court would consider "what the
immature minor would choose if she were mature, taking into account
the child's expressed preference and partial competency.
' 3 64
There are several possible scenarios for a citizen child facing de
facto deportation. First, the child may lack the capacity to make a
decision. If the child cannot decide whether to remain, the courts
have two potential courses of action. One is to allow the parents to
make that decision for the child. This is problematic in that it assumes
that the parents will make a decision that is in the best interests of the
child. Unfortunately, this may not always be the case. In in re
Polovchak,36 5 the parents of a twelve-year-old boy (a legal permanent
resident of the United States) decided to return to the Ukraine after
six months in this country.366 Although the boy wanted to remain in
the United States, and evidence suggested that he would be subject to
persecution if he returned to the Soviet Union, his parents were "ada-
mantly opposed to allowing [him] to remain in the country.
'367
There are situations in which parents will not make the "best"
decision for the child. In the case of Walter Polovchak, his parents
had the luxury of remaining in the United States. They were both
legal permanent residents who were not facing deportation proceed-
ings. Nevertheless, they wanted their son to return to a country to
which he did not want to return. In a situation in which the parents
leave the country, it is much more likely that the parents will take the
child with them. Most parents would be unwilling to leave their chil-
dren in a foreign country. Thus, the parents are forced to decide be-
tween relinquishing their right to raise their own children or allowing
their children to become "deportees." This places the child in the un-
fortunate position of being denied his or her constitutional rights due
to the parents' desire to raise and care for the child themselves.
Fortunately for Walter Polovchak, he was old enough to articulate
and act on his preference. In many situations, the child may be too
young to voice such a preference. What should the court do in these
cases? One answer is for the court to leave the "decision" to the par-
ents. Another answer is for the court to apply the parens patrke
power and determine what would be in the best interests of the
child.368 This would require the court to determine what the child
363. 1& at 354.
364. Id
365. 454 N.E.2d 258 (N.D. I11. 1983).
366. Id. at 259.
367. Id.
368. Brumley, supra note 354, at 354.
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would decide to do were he or she mature enough to make a deci-
sion.369 However, the complexity surrounding immigration issues,
ranging from differences in languages to differences in cultures, makes
it unlikely that the courts could make an accurate determination of
what the child would want. Perhaps a better alternative would be to
suspend deportation or to stay the proceedings until the minor is ma-
ture enough to decide what to do. This would also give parents the
extra time they need to adjust to the possibility that their child will
remain in the United States.
By forcing the parents to decide, or imposing a premature deci-
sion on an immature child, the courts either punish the child for the
acts of the parents or break up the family unit. By allowing the family
to remain intact in this country until the minor is mature enough to
make a competent decision, the courts avoid the problems implicated
in Santosky v. Kramer.37 ° In Santosky, the Supreme Court held that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required a
state to support its allegations by clear and convincing evidence
before it may completely or irrevocably sever the rights of parents in
their natural child.371 The courts have consistently based the right of
parents to control their minor children on the assumption that the par-
ent's affection for the child will lead him or her to act in the best
interest of the child.372 The state can only interfere with the parent-
child relationship to protect the child, when the parent does not act in
the child's best interest.37 3 If the court decided that it was in the best
interest of the child to remain in the United States, it would be acting
under a parens patria justification. The parents would be deported
and the family would be separated, probably terminating the parent-
369. l
370. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). In language relevant to the situation of the child that faces de
facto deportation the Court said:
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody and man-
agement of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been
model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Even
where blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in prevent-
ing the irretrievable destruction of their family life .... When the state moves to
destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally
fair procedures.
Id at 755.
371. Id. at 747, 769.
372. Parham v. J.R. 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
373. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). "It has long been recognized
that, as between a parent and a third person, parental custody of a child may not be dis-
placed absent grievous cause or necessity." Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29
(N.Y. 1991) (quoting Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 70 N.Y.2d 141, 144 (1991)).
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child relationship completely. The Supreme Court in Santosky held
that the state could only permanently terminate parental rights upon a
showing of "clear and convincing evidence" of parental neglect or un-
fitness. 374 This would create a legal "catch-22" because the court
would be encouraged to deem the parents unfit in order to allow the
child to enjoy the benefits of United States citizenship.
If the child is mature enough to decide whether to remain in the
country, then the court should at least consider the stated preference.
If the child's wishes are consistent with his or her parents' wishes, the
only problems are those already discussed in the fundamental rights
section. If the mature minor's choice conflicts with his or her parents',
the Polovchak problem arises. Many children who are competent to
make a decision are not sophisticated enough to know how to access
the legal system. The child still may be forced to leave the country
with his or her parents if he or she is unable to assert his or her rights.
Regardless of the approach the courts choose, some type of inquiry is
necessary to ensure that the rights of the citizen child are protected.
Another problem with the courts' reliance on the notion that a
child can choose to remain in or return to the United States is that
children lack the capacity to make adult decisions. Certainly, a child
does not have the capacity to make an informed, voluntary decision as
to where he or she will live. "Society has set certain age limits and it is
presumed that children below these ages lack full capacity."' 75 These
observations regarding a child's capacity are applicable to situations in
which the courts rule on the deportation of a citizen child's alien
parents.
In practice, a ruling in a case involving a dispute about a child's
capacity to make an independent decision will rarely be made
solely on the basis of the child's maturity and comprehension.
Rather, the tendency will be to assess this capacity by reference
to what is thought to be in the child's best interests. If the
[child's] decision is felt to be contrary to those interests, the
most likely result will be a conclusion that the child lacks the
capacity to make it.
376
The courts, in many cases, attribute full capacity to young toddlers or
infants.3 77 Even if the court assumes that the child will have the ca-
pacity to decide in the future, deportation of the child's parents could
374. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 748.
375. John Seymour, An Uncontrollable Child. A Case Study in Children's and Parent's
Rights, 6 INa. 3. L. FAM. 98, 100 (1992).
376. Id. at 101.
377. Id.
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be suspended until the child has the capacity. By deporting the par-
ents of young children, the court strips the children of their ability to
assert their legal rights.
The Attorney General's current practice violates the substantive
due process rights of citizen children to enjoy the companionship of
their parents. It also denies citizen children the procedural protec-
tions mandated by the Constitution before such a right can be revoked
or restricted. Citizen children of illegal immigrant parents are also
unfairly discriminated against, in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, when they are penalized for exercising fundamental rights en-
joyed by other citizen children. In all cases in which citizen children
of illegal immigrant parents are involved, the government should be
required to make a showing that: (1) the government action promotes
the best interests of the children under the parens patriae doctrine; or
(2) the government action is necessary to achieve a compelling gov-
ernment objective.
VI. Solutions
A. Deference and Due Process
To provide sufficient flexibility and protect important personal
rights, as well as the administrator's needs, independent review should
be grounded in the Due Process Clause. Under this approach, in-
dependent review is required when the importance of the underlying
right and the possibility of an erroneous determination outweighs the
government's interests, indicating that limited review would be funda-
mentally unfair.378 To ensure fairness, the determination of the Attor-
ney General and his delegates should be subject to the balancing test
of Mathews v. Eldridge. 9
The first prong of the Mathews test examines the importance of
the right asserted. 8 Constitutional rights are important factors in
this prong of the test even if the citizen child cannot assert the specific
constitutional right to live in this country.381 An interest similar to
that was found by the Supreme Court to be implicated in Ng Fung Ho
v. White.3 2 In that case the Court said that "to deport one who so
claims to be a citizen obviously deprives him of liberty .... It may
378. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330 (1976).
379. Id. at 335.
380. Id.
381. Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153, 1157 (3rd Cir. 1977).
382. 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
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result also in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life
worth living.""3
This second prong is the risk of an erroneous determination by
the agency.a" The historic distrust of agency adjudication, and the
practical concerns of agency bias or lack of expertise may render the
second prong in Mathews the most important step. 85
The BIA's expertise has traditionally been acknowledged in as-
sessing extreme hardship.38 6 There is no reason, however, to believe
courts could not evaluate extreme hardship just as easily. An inquiry
into the procedural protections afforded by the administrative scheme
and the extent of agency bias are highly relevant. When as a result of
the agency's shortcomings the value of heightened judicial review be-
comes evident, only the strongest countervailing interests will render
such independent review unnecessary.3a
The third prong in Mathews, the analysis of public interest and
administrative burdens, 88 should largely depend upon whether the
parties seek a full hearing de novo or seek independent judgment on
the record compiled by the agency. In a case involving the deporta-
tion of a citizen child in which a motion to reopen is filed to request
suspension of deportation, a hearing is required in order to build a
record for the agency.3 8 9 Since there are significant risks of erroneous
determinations, the third prong is also satisfied.
The central advantage of the Mathews formula is that it does not
mandate one particular form of procedure for every situation. While
the courts have been unsympathetic to rights advanced by citizens in
cases dealing with the INA, Congress has stepped in and acknowl-
edged those rights. Thus, the First Amendment rights denied in Klein-
dienst v. MandeP90 were vindicated by amendments to the 1990
Act. 91 The denial of the right of a United States citizen father to
bring his illegitimate child to America in Fialloa3  was overruled by
383. Id at 284 (citations omitted).
384. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
385. See JAffE, supra note 160, at 647-48 (suggesting independent judicial review might
be warranted when the administrative adjudication carries "grave consequences to the
individual").
386. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (per curiam).
387. See Monaghan, supra note 173, at 262.
388. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
389. 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(d) (1994).
390. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
391. INA, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(3), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
392. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
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section 315 of IRCA, which allowed fathers to bring their illegitimate
children into America if they show a "bona fide parent-child
relationship. '9 3
The Attorney General typically has broad discretion regarding all
deportation matters. Unfortunately, in making decisions within the
statutory framework, the Attorney General, the INS, and the courts
have completely overlooked the rights of United States citizens.
While courts recognize that the INS should have great discretion
in deportation matters,394 there has been a serious oversight with re-
gard to the rights of the citizen children of illegal immigrants. The
fundamental rights of citizen children are viewed only peripherally,
and in the worst cases, these rights are completely disregarded. The
Attorney General's broad discretion in immigration cases should be
exercised within the boundaries of the Constitution. The courts must
hold the Attorney General to this basic standard.
Because the effect of deporting a citizen child's parents is only
addressed when the INS defines the discretionary concept of "extreme
hardship," the courts have allowed the INS to escape the well-estab-
lished constitutional scrutiny which is applied to fundamental rights.
As discussed earlier, superficial examination of the effect of the par-
ent's deportation upon a child violates the substantive due process
rights of the child, the procedural due process rights of the child, and
the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment. 95
It is unclear why our courts will not intervene when these pro-
ceedings deny the rights of United States citizens. The Supreme
Court cites the government's legitimate interest in "creating official
procedures for handling motions to reopen.., so as readily to identify
those cases raising new and meritorious considerations. 396 The Court
is justifiably concerned with the possible "flood" of aliens who will
meet the prima facie requirements if the courts adopt a liberal con-
struction of the term "extreme hardship. '' 397 However, the possibility
that many citizens are losing certain fundamental or "quasi-funda-
mental" rights should be of paramount concern.
In a dissent for the Court of Appeals' decision in Jong Ha Wang
v. INS,398 Judge Goodwin expressed concern with the shift of adminis-
393. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
394. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981).
395. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
396. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145 (1981).
397. Id.
398. 622 F. 2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd per curiam, 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
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tration in hardship deportation cases from the INS to the courts, stat-
ing that Congress' confidence in the broad discretion conferred upon
the INS should remain intact after the Supreme Court's decision in
Jong Ha Wang.399 The Court, however, cannot justify the infringe-
ment of a citizen's fundamental rights merely because Congress has
authorized the infringement.
B. A Broader Definition of Extreme Hardship
If the courts offered citizen children of illegal aliens the same
rights as citizen children of United States citizens, they would have to
intervene in INS suspension of deportation proceedings. This would
require recognizing that economic, educational, and cultural depriva-
tions constitute extreme hardship for children facing de facto
deportation.
Several pre-Jong Ha Wang decisions more closely approximate
the concept of "extreme hardship" to comport with the rights of a
United States citizen child. In Jong Ha Wang v. INS, the Ninth Circuit
held that the Board should consider the "aggregate effect of deporta-
tion on all such persons when the alien alleges hardship to more than
one," and that where a showing of economic hardship is combined
with other substantial hardships, the Board should grant the alien a
hardship hearing.4 ° The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the term "ex-
treme hardship" should be liberally construed "to effectuate its ame-
liorative purpose. ' 40 1 The factors which the court considered in its
determination of extreme hardship were medical problems of the
child, the age of the child, the effect on the child's education, separa-
tion from other family members, and the difficulty in adjusting to a
new country.402
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the "totality of cir-
cumstances" reasoning in Barrera Leyva v. INS.4 3 The court dis-
cussed the need to consider many factors, taken together, which may
constitute extreme hardship.4° The court further held that failure to
consider these factors amounts to an abuse of discretion by the Board
of Immigration Appeals.4 5 Another Ninth Circuit decision held that
the immigration judge abused his discretion in failing to note
399. 1&. at 1351-52 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
400. Jong Ha Wang, 622 F.2d at 1349.
401. Id. at 1346.
402. Id. at 1348 n.7.
403. 637 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1980).
404. Id. at 643.
405. Id
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"favorable" factors stemming from the suspension of deportation for
the mother of six citizen children. °6 Included in these favorable fac-
tors should be the cost the government would incur for the care and
placement of the children.4 7
The United States Supreme Court's deference to the discretion of
the Attorney General in long Ha Wang overturned the holdings in
these earlier cases. The long Ha Wang opinion states that the tradi-
tional scope of discretion of the Attorney General is encroached upon
when a Court of Appeals orders a case be reopened because it finds
more suitable criteria for the definition of "extreme hardship."408 In
this holding, the Court explicitly overturned the Ninth Circuit's "lib-
eral construction" theory. Furthermore, the holding in Barrera Leyva
is no longer good law because it relied on the holding in long Ha
Wang when it stated that because "due consideration was not ac-
corded to many factors ... taken together, the Board or immigration
judge may have found . . . extreme hardship."40 9 However, if the
alien's claims are distorted or disregarded at the initial immigration
hearing, or by the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Ninth Circuit
found judicial review appropriate despite the Supreme Court's limita-
tion on judicial intervention. 410 The Ninth Circuit's holding is limited
to cases in which the immigration judge makes unsupported or unsub-
stantiated claims that the petitioner did not support her children, com-
mitted welfare fraud or inexcusably allowed his or her spouse to
neglect to contribute to the children's support.411 Thus, a court's dis-
cretioil is limited to cases where the immigration court has distorted
the facts regarding the circumstances of the petitioner's request. The
Supreme Court has yet to address this issue after long Ha Wang.
C. Substitute the Substantial Evidence Test for Abuse of Discretion
as a Remedy
Pursuant to INA § 244(a)(1), the Attorney General may, in his
discretion, suspend the deportation of an alien if, in the Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion, the deportation of the alien would result, inter alia, in
the extreme hardship to the alien or his spouse, parent or child who is
406. De La Luz v. INS, 713 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1983).
407. Id. at 546.
408. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981).
409. Barrera Leyva, 637 F.2d at 645.
410. Jara-Navarrete v. INS, 813 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1986). The court specifically men-
tions that other circuits are following this approach. Id. at 1343. Chook Hae v. INS, 756
F.2d 1350, 1351-52 (9th Cir. 1985).
411. De La Luz v. INS, 713 F.2d 545, 546 (9th Cir. 1983).
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a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence.412 Abuse of discretion, in this context, suggests an al-
most extreme deference to the administrative agency's superior ability
to make evidentiary rulings that call for application of judgment.
As one commentator has stated, "it is not clear exactly what ap-
pellate courts mean when they apply tests such as 'abuse of discre-
tion."' 413 In Jong Ha Wang, the Supreme Court stated that the
reviewing court could not overturn the construction given by the At-
torney General to the term "extreme hardship" simply because it pre-
ferred another interpretation of the statute.414 As Professor Leonard
suggests with reference to trial courts, "there is something troubling
about this since the issue is the appellate court's ability to decide that
the trial court (in this case, the Attorney General) did indeed commit
an error."415 When an appellate court finds that error has been com-
mitted and such error has affected a substantial right of a party, the
obvious question raised by Professor Leonard is whether there can be
any doubt that the appellate court has the authority to reverse.416
Notwithstanding this logic, the courts are constrained by the
holding in Jong Ha Wang, and suspension of deportation has become
an illusory remedy.
Case law since Jong Ha Wang demonstrates that the circuits are
split in reviewing suspension of deportation cases.4 17 Courts are split
on the issue of what constitutes "extreme hardship" and the degree of
discretion the BIA should be allowed to exercise in determining ex-
treme hardship.418 As section two of this Article discussed, a leading
case in the Ninth Circuit is Cerrillo-Perez v. INS,4 19 which required the
412. INA, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 244(a)(1), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
413. David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REv.
937, 975 (1990).
414. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. at 144.
415. Leonard, supra note 413, at 979.
416. Id. Replacing the abuse of discretion with a substantial evidence test means that
the role of the reviewing federal court would be to determine whether there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the decision of the Attorney General, not to reweigh the
evidence or try the issue de novo. See generally, Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938) ("Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclu-
sion."). If supported by substantial evidence, the findings of the Attorney General are
conclusive and must be affirmed. However, if an error were committed by the Attorney
General, no amount of discretion should prevent the reviewing court from reversing.
417. See Cerrillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1987); Hernandez-Cordero v.
INS, 819 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1985).
418. Cerrillo-Perez, 809 F.2d 1419; Hernandez-Cordero, 819 F.2d at 562-63.
419. 809 F.2d 1491.
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BIA to carefully show that it considered all relevant factors and did
not distort or disregard factors. Hernandez-Cordero v. INS420 takes
an opposite approach.421 In Hernandez, the Fifth Circuit gave the
BIA almost complete deference in reviewing its decisions.42 2 The ma-
jority only examined whether "'any consideration had been given' by
the BIA to the factors establishing 'extreme hardship."' 4 3
The two standards of review for determinations of "extreme
hardship" from the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit yield very dif-
ferent results. The Hernandez-Cordero standard of review is very low
rendering the BIA decision basically final. The Cerrillo standard of
review allows the appellate court more discretion for review.
The Hernandez and Cerrillo cases demonstrate the varying level
of scrutiny BIA suspension of deportation decisions receive when they
are appealed under the "abuse of discretion" test. These two cases
illustrate the confusion in the reviewing courts as to their ability to
determine whether the Attorney General committed an error and
demonstrate how inadequate the abuse of discretion standard is for
the determination of extreme hardship.424
D. Congressional Action
Congress should overrule Jong Ha Wang for the same reason it
overruled Fiallo v. Bell 4 5 and INS v. Phinpathya.426 In Phinpathya,
the Supreme Court overturned a long line of Ninth Circuit decisions
regarding the first eligibility requirement for suspension of deporta-
tion, the requirement of continuous physical presence in the United
States for a specified time period.427 The Court construed this provi-
sion literally.428 In doing so, the Court held that any absence, no mat-
ter how insignificant, would disrupt the continuity of the alien's
physical presence and, thus, if the absence occurred in the past seven
420. 819 F.2d 558.
421. 819 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1985).
422. d. at 564.
423. d. at 563 (quoting Sanchez v. INS, 755 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1985)).
424. The Ninth Circuit seems to have found a way to give teeth to the abuse of discre-
tion test while formally deferring to the INS discretion in defining "extreme hardship." See
supra note 410. However, the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the validity of these
"abuse of discretion" cases after Jong Ha Wang. Currently this appears to be the most
plausible way for the courts to "check" the congressionally delegated power without rais-
ing a separation of powers issue.
425. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
426. 464 U.S. 183 (1984).
427. Id. at 196.
428. Id. at 192 ("We do justice to this scheme only by applying 'the plain meaning of
[section 244(a)], however severe the consequences.' ").
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years, preclude suspension.429 By passing the Immigration Reform
and Control Act, Congress amended section 1254 of the INA to avoid
the harshness of such literal interpretation and the consequent banish-
ment of aliens.430 Section 1254 now states: "An alien shall not be con-
sidered to have failed to maintain continuous physical presence in the
United States under paragraphs (1) and (2) of the subsection (a) if the
absence from the United States was brief, casual and innocent and did
not meaningfully interrupt the continuous physical presence."
431
Congress should adopt a liberal construction of extreme hardship
and provide guidelines that require the Attorney General to make a
finding of extreme hardship if a majority of the factors set out in the
guidelines are present. In addition to limiting the Attorney General's
discretion, Congress should require the courts to apply a substantial
evidence test upon review.
432
While agency expertise is often cited as a justification for agency
discretion,433 a determination of what factors constitute extreme
hardship for a person or family is not an esoteric question that re-
quires specialized training. As the dissent in Hernandez-Cordero
stated: "[W]hat constitutes [extreme] hardship requires knowledge of
human affairs, judgment, and empathy-qualities that federal judges
should have in at least as much measure as administrative officers."
431
VII. Conclusion
An examination of the treatment of both alien and citizen chil-
dren in this country reveals that the courts are sympathetic to the edu-
cational needs of indigent children who cannot affect their status. In
economic benefits cases, the courts protect citizen children of alien
parents who are vicariously punished for the wrong doing of their par-
429. Id Cf. Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d. 1253 (9th Cir. 1979) (extending the
Fleui test to lawful permanent residents who were considered not to have meaningfully
interrupted their residence in the United States if the absence was brief, casual and inno-
cent); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
430. See De Gurules v. INS, 833 F2d 861, 862 (9th Cir. 1987) for a discussion of Con-
gress' actions.
431. 8 U.S.C. 1254(bb)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
432. The need for clarity regarding the application of the substantial evidence test
stems from the language of the majority opinion in INS v. Doherty, 112 S.Ct. 719, 724
(1992). The Doherty Court appears to only require an abuse of discretion test to be ap-
plied to the review of withholding of deportation which is a mandatory form of relief, id. at
727. See also id at 729-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
433. See KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADIISTRATrvE LAW TREATISE § 29.00-3, 43-44 (Supp.
1982).
434. Hernandez-Cordero, 819 F.2d at 567 (Robin, J., dissenting).
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ents. This protection, however, does not extend to immigration law,
where citizen children's rights are consistently ignored when their par-
ents are deported.
There are several possible remedies for this disparity in treat-
ment. First, the courts should cease to defer to the unfettered grant of
discretion to the Attorney General. The definition of extreme hard-
ship must be scrutinized by the judiciary. Congress is not beyond the
constitutional scrutiny of the court; if a court suspects that a citizen
has been deprived of constitutionally-protected rights, it should ex-
amine, at a minimum, the scope of the deprivation.
The holding in Plyler is logical and just. Following the Supreme
Court's ruling in Plyler, the delegation of complete discretion to the
INS should be reexamined. The judiciary has the power and ability to
determine how much hardship a citizen child must endure before our
government should label the hardship extreme. The courts must meet
the challenges presented by Congress, the Attorney General, and the
INS, and fulfill their role as the final arbiters of constitutional rights.
Second, if the courts continue to defer to the discretion of the
Attorney General, the abuse of discretion remedy should be invoked
more often to check the authority of the INS. The courts have the
power and the means to determine whether the INS has abused its
discretion by failing to consider all the relevant factors surrounding
each petition for a suspension of deportation proceedings. The depri-
vation of rights issues can and should be examined in this context.
The best solution is to amend the INA to require the Attorney Gen-
eral to consider the guidelines proposed in this paper in determining
whether extreme hardship exists, and to substitute the substantial evi-
dence test for abuse of discretion as a standard of review.
Third, the courts should utilize the Ninth Circuit's approach in
cases such as Jong Ha Wang, Cerrillo-Perez and Jara-Navarete, in re-
examining the citizen children's constitutional rights to education,
family autonomy, and residence in the United States. In examining
the constitutional rights of citizen children, the courts should not focus
upon their status as children, but upon their status as citizens.
Our nation's failure to prevent illegal immigration into the
United States has led to a cultural and economic crisis. However, pe-
nalizing citizen children because they were born to illegal alien par-
ents is both illogical and unjust. Before we deprive a citizen child of
his or her fundamental rights and resign him or her to a life outside of
the United States, we must consider thoroughly the condemnation
which we visit on the heads of the innocent:
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[W]hat does it say about our notions of justice when we harbor a
willingness to act against our own children in the name of immi-
gration control? What messages do we communicate to our-
selves and to the world when our courts, once the immigration
law cloak is invoked, turn a blind eye to the reality that our citi-
zen children are hurt in order for our society to strike at their
parents?435
These concerns are very real. We must consider the moral and legal
dilemmas we create when we allow the INS to deport citizen children
without employing any constitutional safeguards.
The United States Supreme Court must exercise leadership and
determine the proper role of the judiciary in this important and sensi-
tive area. Failure to do so will leave the constitutional issues of immi-
gration law in the hands of Congress, the Attorney General, and the
INS, and give these entities unfettered discretion in constitutional
interpretation.
435. Bill Piatt, Born as Second Class Citizens in the U.S.A.: Children of Undocumented
Parents, 63 No=n DAME L. REv. 35, 51 (1988).

